Russian tactics have no secrets, and they have hardly evolved since the capture of Bakhmout, drones in addition: it is about taking advantage of the asymmetry in ammunition and men. This translates, on the ground, into endless bombings followed by offensives of infantrymen sent in successive waves to die on the Ukrainian defenses. The steamroller tactic, in short.
On the Ukrainian side, lack dictates tactics, because there is a shortage: of weapons of all types, of ammunition and military equipment such as armored personnel carriers. The Ukrainian army did what it could with what it had to carry out this trench warfare, but it had, and has, almost nothing compared to the Russian profusion. The hesitations of Ukraine’s allies, led by the Americans and Europeans, have cost many lives here. However, the Ukrainian general staff and government have also made mistakes for which they are paying the price, although they prefer to discard on promised weapons which do not arrive.
The fortifications did not see the light of day because “the money disappeared”
To the south and east of Pokrovsk, the Russian thrust is enormous: troops are concentrating on the south of Donbass to break Ukrainian resistance. The region has great strategic and economic value. By completing its occupation of southern Donetsk Oblast, Russia could threaten the cities of Dnipro and Zaporizhia and would gain control of a mining region crucial to Ukraine’s economy.
It all started with the siege of the fortress town of Avdiivka, north of Donetsk. The fortified lines which had defended it since 2014 held firm until December 2023, when the Russian army resorted to extremely destructive guided bombs, against which the Ukrainians could do nothing due to lack of aviation. The latter were forced to withdraw on February 17, 2024 to avoid encirclement and spare the lives of the soldiers. It was at this moment that an infernal spiral began, in the form of a slow-motion debacle, an inexorable decline which continues today.
Because contrary to what the general staff and President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed the day after the withdrawal from Avdiivka, the Ukrainian defenders were not redeployed on developed, duly prepared and fortified positions. For the simple reason that the latter did not exist, except in dreams or on staff maps. This absence of defensive positions, or their poor quality when they exist, comes up repeatedly in the criticism of the Ukrainian military on the ground. Sometimes they are as funny as they are cruel. “One of our trenches,” explains Ivan, a drone pilot, “was oriented in the right direction with turrets and firing windows set up to target our own forces. We prefer to think that it was an error due to incompetence…”
On condition of anonymity, a military intelligence officer speaks of a complete absence of trenches. “The authorities and the general staff have had time since 2014… But the money has disappeared.” Drone operators from Commander Orel dug out new positions for several nights in mid-November to fly their drones. “It is not our role and now is not the time to do it under enemy fire. But the engineers are not there: our army is falling behind.”
The Kursk offensive, as much a success as an error
In comparison, the Russians are very good at fortifying their positions. The famous Sourovikine line is the best example. As soon as they advance, they bury themselves, digging underground tunnels to the left and right of the main trench to prevent kamikaze drones from succeeding in destroying the underground galleries by shelling them. Thanks to drones, however, an area in which they excel, the Ukrainians manage to slow down the progress of the Russian army. The latter has deployed considerable numbers of troops: the Storm-Z, convicts who act as cannon fodder supported by very professional forces. The use of ever more efficient drones creates a configuration more favorable to infantry assaults than armored vehicles. And in this infantry war, their numbers proved decisive: at 5 to 1, the Russians ended up advancing. We remember the warnings, in the fall of 2023, from Valeri Zalouzhny, then commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ukraine: he then demanded 450,000 men for 2024, demands which cost him his position. The reality on the ground today proves him right, and Volodymyr Zelensky wrong. The Ukrainian army lacks men and, above all, men ready to fight. Blame it on recruitment and management.
This is why the Kursk offensive, although it constituted a masterful coup, was an error on a tactical level. The Ukrainian general staff was mistaken in imagining forcing the Russians to strip their front in the east, when Ukraine lacked more men than Russia. “They withdrew seasoned troops to send them to the Kursk region and we are sorely lacking these men,” explains OPFOR Lieutenant-Colonel Menthol [son nom de guerre, ndlr]. The command recruits poorly motivated men and sends them to the harshest terrain even though the psychological factor is very important. How can we be surprised by desertions?
Volodymyr Zelensky open to territorial concessions, Menthol will still have to be convinced
This phenomenon has gained importance, according to the officers deployed in the East. It primarily affects conscripts mobilized by force, but undermines the morale of all troops by its scale. For Menthol, the problem affects brigades and units made up of new recruits who have neither the skills nor the determination to hold the lines at all costs. “Certain groups are withdrawing too quickly, thus weakening the entire front.” Ivan, the drone pilot, agrees: “Units and brigades which turn back do not incur sanctions. For this reason, refusals to fight are increasing.” Those who wage war, on the other hand, spare neither their efforts nor their courage. “We are not fighting for Donbass or Crimea,” explains Menthol. We defend every square centimeter of Ukrainian territory.”
The weakness of the Ukrainian defenses in the southeast contrasts with the solidity of preparations in the Sumy oblast, opposite Kursk. This disparity can only be explained by the tactical choices of the general staff and the priorities set by the government. Pragmatism trumps all other considerations. Even Volodymyr Zelensky now seems open to territorial concessions. How big? Could the city of Pokrovsk be abandoned? It would then not only be a question of losing a few mines of old polluting coal, but of abandoning to the Russians a mine essential to the production of steel and weapons made in Ukraine. But fervent defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty like Menthol will not be easily convinced to put down their weapons.
