The 2024 European elections saw radical right parties obtain very high scores in several EU countries: this is the case in France, but also in Germany and Italy, or even in Austria, Belgium and the European -Bas as well as in Spain.
These results should not, however, mask the underlying trends at work in the 27 countries of the Union and in the European Parliament: the two founding parties of European construction, the European People’s Party (EPP) and the European Socialist Party ( PSE) (which, in the form of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, has joined the Italian Democratic Party since 2009) consolidate the total number of their seats. The EPP is the bringing together of Christian democrats, from Konrad Adenauer to Angela Merkel and from Jacques Chirac to Nicolas Sarkozy, while the PSE has brought together since the beginning the social democrats of Helmut Schmidt, Willy Brandt, François Mitterand and Jacques Delors. These are the political groups of the founding fathers of Europe.
If the victories in votes and seats of the National Rally and Fratelli d’Italia legitimately attract attention in France and Italy, they do not mark, far from it, a political revolution in Brussels and Strasbourg. In other words, the French, German and Italian trees should not hide the European forest: if the political changes are real, they do not eclipse structural tendencies towards continuity, so that the institutional and political effects of the elections are still uncertain.
Electoral shocks for the founding member states
In the absence of surprises, the European elections triggered political shocks in several founding states of the Union, first and foremost in France, Germany and Belgium. In these three countries, voters largely favored openly nationalist and Eurosceptic parties: the National Rally (31% of the vote, 31 seats out of 81 in total, 1er ahead of Renaissance), the Alternative für Deutschland (15% of the votes, 15 seats out of 91, 2e behind the CDU-CSU) and the two Flemish parties (arrived in the first two positions with each 14% of the votes and 3 seats out of 22 in total).
In these three states, the national political leaders are strongly contested: President Macron dissolves the Assembly, Chancellor Scholz faces strong pressure from the CDU-CSU opposition which demands that he also call early legislative elections and the Prime Minister De Croo resigns. These are not surprises but a very powerful “feedback effect” of European elections on national governments. In other words, the Franco-German “engine”, whether real or imagined, is significantly weakened following these elections.
This trend is accentuated by the confirmation of the successes of the Eurosceptic parties in Italy and Austria. Indeed, Italy’s two radical right parties have amplified their success at the polls compared to the 2022 general elections: Fratelli d’Italia of the President of the Council Meloni improved his score (from 26% in 2022 to more than 28% in 2024) and his number of seats within the group of European Conservatives and Reformists (CRE) in the European Parliament. For its part, the League, led by Matteo Salvini, went from 8.7% to 9% of the votes and obtained 8 seats in the EP, where it sits within a competing group led by the RN, Identity and Democracy (ID ).
As for the FPÖ, in Austria, it finished 1er in number of votes (25.7%) and in number of seats (6), slightly ahead of the traditional parties. Here again, this is neither a tsunami nor a surprise, but a notable development in the political center of gravity of European institutions.
The general withdrawal of environmentalist and liberal parties in the European Parliament and the growth of nationalist contingents from the CRE and ID groups mean that the European Parliament will move to the right (classical or radical), despite good resistance from the PES.
Classic parties strengthened at European level
Above all, we must not neglect, when reading the results, the elements of continuity. First of all, the specter of abstention has not been averted for the European elections. Thus, records were broken in several Member States, such as Italy (51%), Poland (60%) and Spain (50%). More than a political release, the European elections always arouse the indifference of a large part of Europeans. Political passions, particularly French ones, should not mask the sluggishness of electoral campaigns on the continent.
As for the articulation between the European political level and the national level, it has not substantially changed: the European elections remain the result of 27 local elections where the voter takes sides (or abstains) depending on the offer, tempo and local political issues.
Above all, the greatest continuity can be observed in the seat scores of the two major parties which created, developed, strengthened and managed European construction. The EPP and the PSE both maintained their respective quotas of seats out of the 720 put to the vote: the EPP obtained more than 180 seats, as during the previous mandate; the PSE won 135 seats compared to 148 during the last legislature.
Verian, for the European ParliamentCC BY-NC-ND
As for the extreme right parties, they remain divided between CRE and ID at EP level. If the CRE and ID groups do not recompose, in the 2024 EP these groups will respectively have 73 seats (compared to 69 in the previous EP) and 59 seats (compared to 51 in the previous EP).
This division is not cosmetic: it covers very bitter struggles which led to exclusions and splits during the 20219-2024 mandate. The disunity of radical right parties makes it difficult to form strong alliances within the EP. There is more than one fundamental difference between Fratelli d’Italia, AfD, FPÖ, PiS, National Rally, Vox or Vlaams Belang. The inability to unite beyond a few emblematic public policy subjects will remain, for these parties, a constant of the 2024-2029 EP.
Announcing a political revolution in Brussels and Strasbourg is therefore exaggerated or premature. Like any complex and territorially vast democracy, the EU is experiencing electoral restructuring and political developments. 2024 only marks a major partisan break in certain member states. France is likely to see the RN accede to government responsibilities, but the Union is not overwhelmed by a brown wave.
Towards a second von der Leyen Commission
The first consequences of these elections will be, mechanically, the appointments at the head of the main institutions of the European Union and the evolution of political alliances within the parliamentary groups of the European Parliament.
The appointment of the EU’s top leaders is a complex process influenced by the results of European elections. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s candidacy for Commission presidency could lose strength due to the French results. President Macron had in fact launched a campaign in his favor.
On the other hand, it seems that the outlook is brightening for Ursula von der Leyen, outgoing President of the Commission, who is gaining credibility for a second term due to the victory of the EPP. Its management of recent crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the implementation of the European Green Deal or its posture during the war in Ukraine, could strengthen its position. In addition, her rapprochement, although highly criticized, with Giorgia Meloni increases her chances of being reappointed at the head of the Commission.
Correlatively, French influence risks diminishing in the European decision-making process, both in the Council and in Parliament. The weakening of Emmanuel Macron’s position could reduce Paris’ ability to guide decisions at Council level: how can we push forward bold proposals on the war in Ukraine if the French president is not listened to in his own country? And how can we make up for the inevitable delay in getting the French public authorities started to put together a work program? In Parliament, the situation is hardly more encouraging, since the key positions of president and vice-president of important committees are often determined by a mixture of merit and seniority. The profile of French MEPs could clearly put them at a disadvantage for future appointments.
The end of the Green Deal and support for Ukraine?
Contrary to what a quick overview might suggest, the political weakening of Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz does not necessarily mean a weakening of the EU as a whole. However, this could result in a refocusing of the two leaders on the internal affairs of France and Germany, respectively. This could reduce their ability to exert decisive influence over European policies in the short term, paving the way for other member states to play a more central role in EU decision-making.
In any case, the new majorities in the European Parliament risk being less stable than in the past, when the EPP and the PSE ruled in condominiums. This instability could make it difficult to implement coherent policies and potentially delay the adoption of important new legislation. Some should be monitored more specifically.
Thus, EU defense policy and military support for Ukraine will likely be questioned following the election results. Although these policies partially depend on European institutions, the composition of Parliament will influence debates and priorities. New political alliances could lead to reassessments of the EU’s military support and defense commitments.
In addition, the Green Deal for Europe, the cornerstone of Ursula von der Leyen’s first presidency, could be called into question by the new political balances. Paradoxically, von der Leyen could remain in her position but with a mandate to revise or even unravel some of the environmental policies she initially promoted. Growing political resistance and shifting priorities could weaken ambitious goals to combat climate change.
Finally, the recent Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted after difficult negotiations in May 2024, also risks being called into question. Political parties opposed to more liberal immigration policies could seek to gut it or substantially modify it, making its enforcement less effective. This could lead to increased divergences between Member States on the management of migration flows and asylum policies.
