The war in Ukraine is “a struggle on the spiritual front” said Patriarch Kirill last March, on the occasion of the Day of the National Guard Troops to whom he wished “strength, courage and help from God“. For the strongman of the Russian Orthodox Church (EOR), Russian soldiers “are called upon to tirelessly defend the homeland [face à] external malevolent forces“. The head of the Moscow Patriarchate thus reiterates his support for the war that Russia is waging against Ukraine.
Coming from the most conservative branch of the EOR, the patriarch believes that Russia is one of the ten countries “truly sovereign“on the globe, that is to say”independent of any other center of power“like NATO. Assuming its extreme homophobia, it displays its desire to eliminate from the Public sphere behaviors that it considers deviant and imported from”the decadent West“. As early as March 2022, he justified the war by speaking of a fight against gay pride. But beyond these conspiratorial remarks, he also affirms that Russian civilization is a community carrying God which goes beyond peoples and ethnic groups. Reason why, according to him, the EOR must go beyond Russian borders to strengthen and extend its canonical influence… If too many obstacles present themselves, a war may prove necessary.
The EOR is also fully invested in the missions of the Russian army through its “Institute of Military Clergy”, managed by the “Synodal Department of Cooperation with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement”. According to the latest figures, dating from 2017, 172 ecclesiastics fulfilled pastoral, but also military, functions: visits to the front, trips on warships, participation in exercises… The EOR presents military engagement as a sacrifice to be cleansed of his sins. “Concerned about the salvation of the human soul, [l’Église] pays special attention to those who perform their military and sacred duty“, we can read in the bulletin of a theological seminar organized in 2023.
The same imperial imagination
The civilizational reading of the conflict in Ukraine delivered by Patriarch Kirill matches the imperial imagination of Vladimir Putin. The head of the Moscow Patriarchate has almost always displayed unfailing support for the president, first out of personal convictions, then through a professional strategy to preserve his relations with those in power. The only real exception was the unilateral annexation of Crimea in 2014, which he neither supported nor condemned. Anxious not to make his Church appear as a puppet of Moscow, his priority was rather to maintain ecclesiastical cohesion with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
The “special operation” of 2022 turned this diplomatic restraint upside down. Damned whatever happens by the Ukrainian faithful, the patriarch hardened his speech over the course of the conflict to slide towards real war propaganda clearly providing moral support for the invasion of Ukraine. A document issued on March 27 by the Russian People’s World Council – which he chairs – illustrates this perfectly. Presenting eight proposals for “protect, strengthen and restore the unity of the Russian world“, the text supports the need for a “special military operation against the kyiv regime and against the West which supports it“. It evokes a “holy war in which Russia and its people defend the unique spiritual space of Holy Russia [et] protect the world from the assaults of globalism and the West which has fallen into Satanism.” For him, “Russia must become one of the main centers of the multipolar world“, meaning “the highest of its existence“being to be”the global ‘Holder’ that protects [l’humanité] difficulty“. These remarks with a messianic, even eschatological dimension, justify the use of “self-defense” by Russia… or even the use of nuclear weapons. On the ground, it has already happened that certain military priests bless weapons, including nuclear weapons.
Confessional diplomacy
Is the support enjoyed by Vladimir Putin from the head of the EOR reciprocal? In any case, the president regularly mobilizes confessional diplomacy to increase his influence and defend his conservative ideology within society. Russian propaganda organs have also borrowed from the patriarch the term “de-Satanization” of Ukraine since the fall of 2022. Vladimir Putin also integrates into his ideological speeches certain ideas promoted by the most conservative branch of the EOR, such as the promotion of the family as a school of life.
For Vladimir Putin, religious identity is not all-powerful, it is strategic
The president, however, values the secular and multi-faith character of the Russian Federation, a status which allows him to manage the ethnic diversity of his territory in the face of the permanent risk of internal destabilization. Especially since being Orthodox is more about culture than religious practice in Russia. The churches there are little attended, there is a shortage of priests. According to a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in 2020 (one of the largest polling centers in Russia), while 63% of Russians surveyed declare themselves Orthodox, 24% of them do not identify as believers. . Patriarch Kirill’s argument that the Orthodox religion is that of the majority therefore does not hold. The so-called “numerical superiority” is essentially used to bring together the Orthodox outside the borders around religious patriotism.
However, any patriotism remains good for Vladimir Putin, whether religious or political. The EOR is therefore only one instrument of influence among others for the head of the Kremlin, who wants to remain master of his word on the question of values. Religious identity is not all-powerful, it is strategic.
Domination of the Kremlin
The EOR therefore remains totally subordinate to the Kremlin. Whether or not they adhere to the vision of Patriarch Kirill, clerics need the power to impose their moral and political point of view, particularly in educational establishments. Their effective audience is so limited that it is more strategic for them not to criticize the ambitions of Vladimir Putin, or even to get closer to the mysteries of power.
They are not the only ones: certain representatives of the force structures, such as the siloviki (who ensure the application of the law), also wish to promote and legitimize national conservatism. This common interest reinforces the collusion – already old – between certain members of the high clergy and representatives of the armed forces. A rapprochement that suits ultimately always the same person: Vladimir Putin, at the head of all these informal power structures which federate among themselves.
The EOR is also not very hierarchical. If Patriarch Kirill can submit recommendations to Russian Orthodox priests, he does not have the right to impose any position on them. As worrying as his speech may be, it therefore does not have the possibility of automatically spreading to all the homilies in the country. On the Moscow Patriarchate website, communications strive to remain neutral: none explicitly alludes to the conflict in Ukraine or condemns any of the parties. Only the transcripts of Patriarch Kirill’s speech expressly legitimize the invasion of Ukraine. This religious patriotism certainly gives a little boost to the Kremlin’s war propaganda, without influencing it in a decisive way. In the end, it is still Vladimir Putin who emerges as the chief historian of the homeland, rejecting any form of dependence on the Russian Orthodox Church.
