Since the fall on December 8, “a notable volume of Russian military resources has been channeled to Libya from Belarus and Russia”, according to a British institute.
Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Russia, January 6, 2025. (POOL/VYACHESLAV PROKOFYEV)
If the new power in Syria wanted to be reassuring about its future relations with Russia, the fall of Bashar al-Assad is a hard blow for Moscow’s African projects. Vladimir Putin is now forced to look for an alternative support point on another shore of the Mediterranean. In the crosshairs, Libya.
Moscow has a military port and an air base on the Syrian coast, which facilitate its operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and central and sub-Saharan Africa – Sahel, Sudan, Central Africa in particular. But the ousting of the Syrian dictator jeopardizes this model. The president of the Syrian transition Ahmad al-Chareh wanted to be reassuring,
calling Russia an “important country” from which he does not want to leave.
The uncertain political reorganization of the country, however, forces Moscow to begin a strategic withdrawal towards Libya, where Russian mercenaries supported Marshal Khalifa Haftar, master of the east of the country, against the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, recognized by the UN and supported by Turkey.
“The aim is in particular to preserve the Russian missions already underway in Africa”
explains to the
AFP
Jalel Harchaoui, from the British RUSI institute. “This is a self-preservation reflex” from Moscow, keen “to mitigate the deterioration of its position in Syria”. In May 2024, the Swiss investigative consortium All Eyes On Wagner identified the presence or Russian activities on around ten Libyan sites, including the port of Tobruk where military equipment had been delivered in February and April.
Russian forces represented some 800 men in February 2024, 1,800 in May.
And on December 18,
Wall Street Journal
cited Libyan and American officials to reveal the transfer from Syria to Libya of Russian radars and defense systems, including S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft batteries. Since the fall of Assad on December 8, “a notable volume of Russian military resources has been transported to Libya from Belarus and Russia”, confirms Jalel Harchaoui, also mentioning fighters.
Disrupting Western interests
Ukrainian intelligence for its part affirmed on January 3 that Moscow planned “the use of the Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships to transport military equipment and weapons” from one country to another.
This shift does not come from a simple forced change of regional ally, but from a quest for “continuity”, assures expert Emadeddin Badi on the Atlantic Council website. It “underlines the importance of Libya as (…) an element of a long-term strategy”. For him, “Assad offered Moscow an anchor on the eastern flank of NATO and a stage on which to test its capabilities.
Haftar represents a similar opportunity to disrupt Western interests
(and) exploit Libyan political divides.”
The government in Tripoli and Italy, a former colonial power, were indeed moved by the Russian movements, observed with concern by the European Union and NATO. Guido Crosetto, Italian Defense Minister, affirmed that Moscow was transferring “resources from its Syrian base in Tartous”, in Syria, “to Libya”. And several sources report American efforts to convince Haftar to refuse the Russians the lasting installation on the port of Tobruk that they have coveted since 2023.
In fact,
the Kremlin will struggle to regain the comfort it enjoyed under Assad.
“Syria was practical. It was a black box without foreign diplomats or journalists. (The Russians) generally did what they wanted,” notes for the
AFP
Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, based in Bamako. “In Libya, it will be much more complicated. Secrets there are difficult to preserve and the Russian presence will be much more visible.”
Dealing with Turkey and Egypt
Moscow will also have to deal with other powers
including Turkey, an ally of the GNU, but also Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, sponsors of Haftar. And she will be keen not to jeopardize her future if things go wrong for her. “We must not repeat Syrian mistakes and make a bet without alternative on a local dictator,” warns in this regard Vlad Shlepchenko, military correspondent for the pro-Kremlin media Tsargrad.
In a Libya torn apart since the death of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and today split in two, “everyone is playing both sides”, summarizes Ulf Laessing.
For a year, Ankara has even gotten closer to Haftar, based on economic projects and meetings of a diplomatic nature.
The marshal, accustomed to about-faces, cannot himself alienate the Westerners who discreetly supported him, convinced of his ability to limit the spread of Islamism. “So there are undoubtedly limits to what the Russians can do in Libya,” concludes the analyst.
