The command of the borders of Morocco, established in Agadir, administered the Saharan regions of the south of Agadir, Drâa, Oued Noun, the north of present-day Mauritania, up to Boujdour. In the East, the command of Agadir included, in Algeria, Tindouf, Tabelbala and the north of Touat. The command was officially abolished following a series of administrative and political deliberations at the highest levels in France.
This command, established during the colonial period to manage sensitive border areas, particularly in the face of territorial claims and security issues, was seen as a vestige of French administration in the region. The abolition of this entity marked a crucial step in the transition towards the independence and sovereignty of the new states, notably that of Morocco, which had just obtained its independence in March 1956.
This decision was made during a strategic meeting in the office of Latour, then stationed at the Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs. The decisive meeting was held after an important interministerial session on September 22, 1956, dedicated to the removal of command from the Algerian-Mauritanian-Moroccan borders.
The National Overseas Archives (ANOM) preserve precious traces of these administrative and political exchanges. These archives, grouped in particular in the Ministerial Fund 1AFFPOL/905, offer a detailed overview of the strategic concerns and territorial issues of the time.
Among the key documents is a letter dated September 30, 1954, addressed by the Minister of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs to the Minister of Overseas France, under the reference number 744. This official correspondence highlighted the political uncertainties surrounding the transition post-colonial, highlighting the fears linked to the emergence of independence demands and the logistical difficulties that a redistribution of administrative skills would involve. She also spoke of the need to maintain close cooperation between regional governments and the central administration to guarantee border security. In addition, this document reported on latent territorial disputes, particularly those between the future independent states of the Maghreb, and laid the foundations for strategic reflection on the methods of managing the disputed areas. Finally, it raised questions concerning the management of natural resources in these regions, in particular the oil and mineral reserves of the Sahara, which were already arousing marked interest among political and economic decision-makers.
Attending this meeting were: Briand for the Ministry of Overseas France, Rosier for the Ministry of the Interior, Casset for the Southern Territories, the general government of Algeria, Colonel de Fürst and Baudouy for the General Residence in Morocco, Latour and Guena from the Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, without forgetting representatives of the special staff of National Defense.
Political pressures due to the rise of Moroccan nationalism and the French project to strengthen the colony of Mauritania were at the origin of this decision to remove the command of the borders of Agadir which controls the territories up to the 26th parallel . The representative of the Ministry of Overseas France, Briand, gave the following explanation, which did not hide his hostile vision towards Morocco: “Security exists and Mauritania can take responsibility for maintaining order in its territory; it is unfortunate to allow the political ambiguity of allegiance to Morocco to persist in the minds of the nomadic tribes of Mauritania; finally, (and with a view to negotiations with Spain), for the evacuation of iron ore from Fort-Gouraud, it would be desirable for the AOF to be, as far as it is concerned, solely responsible for relations with the Spanish from Rio de Oro, in order to avoid friction during these negotiations (Tefariti incident)» (ANOM, Ministerial Fund 1AFFPOL/905, Proceedings of the meeting relating to the abolition of the Algerian-Mauritano-Moroccan border command, pp. 3-4.).
The OCRS and the question of Moroccan borders and territories
The project of the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (OCRS) officially came into being with the promulgation of the law of January 10, 1957. This organization aimed to preserve the economic and strategic interests of France in the Saharan regions, rich in natural resources. . The OCRS was imagined as an instrument of centralized management and administrative coordination, bringing together several Saharan territories under the same political-economic entity, independently of the borders established between the colonies.
As early as 1956, a year before the adoption of this law, Morocco, newly independent, had been warned of this project by the French authorities. The latter had contacted Rabat in the hope of finding a concerted solution to the delimitation of borders in the Saharan zones. This approach, although apparently diplomatic, concealed strategic intentions aimed at consolidating French influence in regions where mining and oil resources constituted a major issue.
Morocco, while displaying a desire for cautious cooperation, quickly perceived the ambiguities of this project. He saw in the OCRS a roundabout way for France to maintain its economic and military presence in a key region, despite the progress of the decolonization processes. As a result, the discussions between the two parties revealed fundamental differences: while France sought to institutionalize transnational control over the resources of the Sahara, Morocco demanded the restoration of its historical borders and its territorial sovereignty over these regions.
A note written for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Ahmed Belafrej, recalls this: “This question was raised even before the declaration and the protocol of March 2, 1956 and Mr. Ahmed Belafrej raised it again, in Paris, during the summer of 1956 and on several other occasions. The proposal to convene a commission to study the question of borders and proceed with their delimitation was accepted in principle. The study of this question appears more and more urgent and necessary. By receiving the above-mentioned text of the law, the Minister can only renew the reservations expressed in his notes dated August 8 and 28 regarding the designation “French territory” of certain regions covered by the above-mentioned law. (ANOM, Aix-en-Provence, Ministerial Funds, 1Affpol/2321, Cherifian Empire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rabat, March 4, 1957).
The project to connect Tindouf to the Atlantic was a priority. The 1958 session was held in the presence of Mauritanians and Nigeriens and with the participation of François Mitterrand, under the adage: “He who has economic strength has political strength“. And the report states: “We will see at that time, the share that should go to each, but we must first work together» (ANOM, Aix-en-Provence, Ministerial Funds, 1Affpol/2321, Minutes, Inaugural Session of the OCRS, Paris, January 21-24, 1958).
The empire that could not reach the Atlantic
Heir to the French colonial empire, Algeria has constantly used unhealthy maneuvers and geopolitical plots against Morocco. From the first years of its independence, it allied itself with colonial Spain between 1963 and 1970, exploiting border and territorial tensions to weaken its western neighbor. This policy of destabilization was also manifested by active support for rebellions and coups d’état orchestrated in a vast area extending from Niger to Mauritania during the period 1970-1979, with the aim of diplomatically isolating Morocco. and to extend its influence over North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
The only moment of respite in this rivalry came with the signing of the 1972 treaty, marking a temporary agreement on the delimitation of borders, and the establishment of a joint exploitation project for the Gara Djebilet iron mine. This rapprochement, although fragile, had suggested a possibility of economic cooperation between the two countries. However, this dynamic quickly faded in favor of a return to tensions, fueled by strategic differences and persistent hegemonic ambitions on the part of Algiers.
Algeria played the wealth card to definitively settle the issue of the Algerian-Moroccan borders, and to be able to embark on a crazy project of access to the Atlantic, inherited from the ultras of French Algeria. French general staffs knew what to expect in the event of the creation of secessionist entities. The day after the recovery of the Tarfaya region on April 10, 1958, in application of the Cintra agreement signed by ministers Ahmed Belafrej and Fernando Castiella, French colonial sources reported the opposition of the Algerian FLN to Moroccan demands.
French general staffs, aware of the geopolitical issues in the region, already anticipated the potentially destabilizing consequences that the creation of secessionist entities supported by Algiers would entail.
In this context, the day after the recovery of the Tarfaya region, which took place on April 10, 1958 under the Cintra agreement, signed between the Moroccan ministers Ahmed Belafrej and the Spanish minister Fernando Castiella, French colonial sources reported signals of opposition from the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). The latter categorically rejected Moroccan claims to the Saharan territories, seeing in these claims an obstacle to its own vision of regional hegemony and geopolitical expansion.
This opposition marked the beginning of a deep rivalry, where Algeria, despite its shared colonial past with Morocco, chose to actively challenge the legitimacy of Moroccan claims, while pursuing its own strategic ambitions in North Africa and beyond. .
This is in fact what this dispatch sent on April 14, 1958 by Chaban-Delmas, Minister of National Defense to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalls. He stated there: “We have all the more interest in demanding the opening (negotiations on the borders with Morocco) as Morocco is gradually discovering the difficulties of the problem, facing Spain, French Algeria and even the FLN» (Archives of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve, Morocco 212, 1956-1968, April 14, 1958, No. 1158, 7 pages, p. 6).
