Until recent weeks, this issue was discreetly kept quiet, but on May 2, 2024, Algerian diplomacy broke the taboo when Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf informed his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, that his country’s policy in the Sahel went against his own interests.
A simple glance at a map is enough to see that the Sahel-Saharan question directly concerns Algeria. In the vast Saharan expanses that France offered it in 1962 live the Tuaregs who, in the past, have never depended on regional states.
The Algerian Tuareg belong to three confederations, only one of which, that of the Hoggar, has its territory, that is to say its former nomadic zones, entirely in Algeria. This is not the case of the Kel Adrar (the Iforas) who extend beyond present-day Algeria to extend over the entire north of present-day Mali, and of the Kel Ajjer, part of whose territory is located in Libya.
Algeria therefore jealously monitors everything that happens in the Sahara-Sahelian zone because, for it, the logic of chaos which develops hotbeds of instability there directly threatens its stability and security.
This is why, right after independence, Algeria became involved in the region. In 1963-1964, during the first Tuareg war in Mali, President Ahmed Ben Bella authorized the Malian army to pursue the Tuareg rebels of Mali up to 200 km inside Algerian territory, that is to say, up to the northern limits of the Kel Adrar area.
In January 1991, during the second Tuareg war in Mali, Algeria organized negotiations between General Moussa Traoré and the MPA (Popular Movement of Azawad) of Iyad ag Ghali, which allowed the signing of the Agreement de Tamanrasset from January 5-6, 1991. A mediation which then allowed the signing of the Pacte national of April 11, 1992.
Peace did not return, however, because northern Mali gradually became a “grey zone” where survivors of the Algerian jihadist maquis took refuge, linking up with traffickers of all kinds and some diehards of the Tuareg cause. In 2007, they joined forces with “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), a movement itself descended from the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) born in Algeria in 1998.
On May 23, 2006, the third Tuareg war in Mali broke out. It was once again Algeria that allowed the signing of the Algiers Agreements for the restoration of peace and development in the Kidal region. Agreements signed on July 4, 2006 between the Malian State and the Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change (ADC), a movement founded by Iyad Ag Ghali, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga and Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan Ag Fagaga.
The fourth Tuareg war (2007-2009) broke out on May 11, 2007, at the initiative of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga who had taken up arms again. Wounded in combat, he was treated in Algeria.
After the outbreak of the fifth Tuareg war in 2011, Algeria was once again at the helm to try to put an end to it. Thus, on May 15, 2015, theAlgiers Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed, however, the weapons continued to speak, the power in Bamako having refused to truly take into account the demands of the Tuareg of the MNLA. As these agreements did not address the fundamental problems, namely the question of the sharing of power between the North and the South, they therefore only temporarily froze the antagonisms.
However, the departure of French forces from Barkhane has resulted in thawing the issue. Indeed, aided by Russian militias from Wagner and then Africa Corps, the southerners in power in Bamako, launched into the reconquest of northern Mali, have retaken the city of Kidal. The Malian junta then declared that it was renouncing the Algiers peace agreement signed in 2015 between the Bamako government and the rebel groups of the Coordination of Azawad Movements.
Faced with this defeat, the different factions of the Coordination of Azawad Movements reorganized themselves with the support of Algiers and, on May 2, 2024, they created a new coalition, the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA).
Now that the conflicting interests of Algeria and Russia are clearly exposed, Moscow will have to make choices. Since it finds it difficult to cut itself off from Algeria, it may then choose to curb the ardor of its allies in the Malian junta. But in this case, disappointments will arise that will cast a cloud over the “honeymoon” between Bamako and Moscow.
