La Croix: At the time of Donald Trump’s inauguration, what is the situation on the Ukrainian front, and primarily around the city of Pokrovsk, an important crossroads in the Donbass?
Stéphane Audrand: The Russians have reached the outskirts of the city and are proceeding in a fairly classic manner in front of a well-defended urban center: by “removing the stones” from the wall in front of them, so as to cut off the supply routes and degrade gradually the responsiveness of the Ukrainian defensive system. They are currently attempting an envelopment from the west, taking up positions, and will probably try to do the same on the road east of the city. I don’t think they’re in a hurry to tackle the city itself, as urban combat is very costly. They will try to isolate and surround it, while exerting pressure everywhere else on the front.
In the Donbass, the city of Toretsk is almost taken, and the Russians are also advancing in the city of Chassiv Yar. What strategy are they pursuing?
S. T. : The capture of these two cities allows progress towards the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk conurbation, and the objective set by Vladimir Putin of “liberating” the entire Donbass. More generally, the Russians are waging a methodical battle across the entire front, exerting a form of pressure everywhere. They are in the process of retaking Velyka Novosylka, the only large town liberated by the Ukrainian army during its counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, and are retaking all the advances made by the Ukrainians in the “Surovikin line”, the large defensive device Russian on the southern front. They take off their shoes, they improve their positions, they push… and this is how they have been progressing little by little for a year.
On arrival, that doesn’t add up to a lot of square kilometers taken by the Russian army, but not all square kilometers are equal. Above all, this widespread attack prevents the rest and reorganization of the Ukrainian army. This is an essential element of Russian strategy: imposing permanent overheating which consumes equipment and men, and which prevents the Ukrainian army from breathing and “adapt to win”to use Michel Goya’s expression (1).
What do the recent setbacks of the “Anne of kyiv” brigadetrained and equipped by France, but almost immediately “dismembered” by the Ukrainian military command?
S. T. : This is emblematic of a broader problem in the Ukrainian army, which prefers to create new brigades (training of several thousand men, Editor’s note) rather than pouring its recruits into already existing brigades. The problem is that kyiv lacks the equipment to equip these new brigades, and they do not have combat experience. More broadly, the Ukrainian army is having more and more organizational and command difficulties.
This is seen in the disorderly construction of the fortifications, the lack of homogeneity of the brigades, which are managed like SMEs and compete with each other, the failures of the intermediate command, the management of volunteers, and this choice to create new brigades.
Likewise, I find it difficult to understand their obsession with the millimeter defense of the territory. Ditto for their choice to hold on to the territory they took in the Russian region of Kursk, which has no political value. They are perhaps trying to “bleed” the Russian army, which is forced into costly offensives. This may have been effective at the beginning, but the Ukrainians are now suffering more losses, and this in experienced units.
-What are the risks for the Ukrainian army?
S. T. : What worries me is that the curves have crossed in 2024 regarding the quality of organizations. Before, the Ukrainians were reactive and knew how to seize opportunities on the battlefield. There, we see that they are making mistakes that the Russians are exploiting. Conversely, the Russian army takes advantage of the fact that it is on the offensive to impose its tempo and rotate its units. So the general level is starting to rise among them.
The risk for Ukraine is the “cliff effect”: a sudden fall of a section of the front. With two limits. The first is that the Russians would have difficulty exploiting it, because it would require reconstituting concentrations of armored vehicles. The second is that it is not known how long the Russian army can continue to push. It has been on the offensive for more than a year now and has suffered heavy human and material losses. In recent days, we have seen a drop in the intensity of the attacks. But it may only be temporary.
The return of Donald Trump on Monday January 20 will reshuffle the cards of this conflict…
S. T. : We are in uncertainty. Some Republicans want to continue helping Ukraine, others want to reduce support to prioritize China, and still others are ready to completely abandon kyiv. But Trump or no Trump, let’s keep in mind that Ukraine’s destiny is in our hands.
We, Europeans, have the means to help Ukraine hold on enough to defeat this Russian aggression. Although late, we have increased our capacity in the production of shells. It’s a question of will. I am convinced that if we refuse to pay now, we will pay triple later. Paradoxically, political courage is perhaps what is most lacking in Europe.
(1) Adapt to win. How armies evolve, Michel Goya, Éditions Perrin, 2019.
