The decision to dissolve the National Assembly taken by President Emmanuel Macron on Sunday June 9 following the European elections has raised a series of questions.
One question in particular arises: given the political recompositions currently underway, will there be a majority in the Assembly that emerges from the ballot boxes on July 7? And if not, what are the possible scenarios?
Article 12 of the Constitution indicates that a new dissolution cannot be carried out in the year following these elections. This measure, which, historically, intended to put a brake on parliamentary instability, today represents a restrictive framework: political forces are called upon to create a form of majority that can support a government, or at least not dismiss it. It is possible to evoke here the precedent of the political crisis in Belgium when, from 2010 to 2011, it was impossible to form a government, the outgoing executive handling current affairs. A similar situation was observed in Northern Ireland between 2017 and 2018.
These hypotheses seem far removed from the political practice of the Ve republic within which we observe a majority logic marked by the role of a President of the Republic elected by universal suffrage and usually capable of bringing about the victory of his side during the legislative elections, a mechanism amplified by the constitutional reform of 2000.
Faced with this original situation for France, it may be wise to analyse comparable cases. From this point of view, the formula of technical governments in Italy may constitute, if not an example, at least a timely point of reflection.
Temporary governments in times of crisis
The expression “technical government” is associated with the executives chaired by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in 1993, Lamberto Dini in 1995, Mario Monti in 2011 and Mario Draghi in 2021. These governments all appeared in the context of a political crisis, i.e. that is to say, an absence of a parliamentary majority capable of supporting a partisan coalition, a situation which led to the appointment of a head of government – in Italy, the president of the council of ministers – capable of constituting a supported cabinet by the majority, if not all, of the political forces in the name of a logic of national unity.
In these periods of crisis, it is necessary to underline the specific role of the Italian head of state, the President of the Republic, who exercises a remarkable power of initiative whereas in “normal” times his function as guarantor results in a relatively hidden profile, in any case outside the sphere of executive power.
During these political moments which aim to form a government, the President of the Italian Republic consults each of the parliamentary groups to collect the indications and availability of all the parties, who can also express their preferences for the appointment of this or that official to the head of government. Once all of these consultations have been completed, and after having heard the opinions of all parties, even minor ones, the President of the Republic entrusts a person with the task of forming the government. The latter receives an exploratory mandate and will for its part verify the feasibility of an executive in terms of team and parliamentary support. If the conditions are met, it will then lift this reservation to present the new executive to the chambers and obtain a vote of confidence.
The so-called “technical” formula appeared in 1993 with the government chaired by the former governor of the Bank of Italy Carlo Azeglio Ciampi; we find it again in 1995 when Lamberto Dini, former general director of the Bank of Italy, was responsible for training the executive; then with the government of Mario Monti in 2011; finally, in 2021, Mario Draghi is called to head a technical government.
Technical government is a response to a situation of political deadlock: in 1993, the context is that of the collapse of the first Italian Republic, the system which had gravitated since 1948 around Christian Democracy and which was brought down by a succession of cases of corruption and illegal financing of political parties. The search for transversal majorities was then necessary, which would also be the case in 1995, when the coalition resulting from the polls in 1994 was flawed by its fragility.
These characteristics will be found in the case of the Monti government which in 2011 made it possible to overcome the blockages linked to the erosion of Silvio Berlusconi’s majority, a dimension that we also see during the loss of majority in the Senate of the Conte government. II which will lead to the appointment of Mario Draghi as chairman of the board in 2021.
These governments which were born in a context of crisis of the parliamentary majority all had a limited duration: between one and two years. They therefore appear as a period of transition which allows both to ensure the continuity of the institutional and political framework, but also to prepare for the return to a cycle based on the election. They offer the advantage of a form of democratic breathing which does not deny the majority fact but allows the modalities to be organized in the event of a blockage.
“Mixed” governments capable of adopting unpopular measures
One of the most obvious characteristics of these executives is the economic competence of the heads of government appointed: Ciampi, Dini and Monti come from the Bank of Italy, an institution renowned for the quality of its staff, while Mario Monti was president of the prestigious Luigi Bocconi University in Milan before becoming European Commissioner in charge of competition.
These economic profiles have a direct political significance: they illustrate the desire to offer an impeccable image from a budgetary and financial point of view, with the appointed leaders being able to stay the course in terms of spending trajectories and therefore to generate confidence international markets. These personalities therefore appear to be guarantors of Italy’s stability in a European and international framework, a factor which helps cut short speculation.
The composition of these governments is most of the time mixed: it combines technical ministers – recognized experts in their field of expertise who have never had political responsibilities – with personalities who have had a stint in politics without being identified as symbols of this or that party.
The agenda of these technical governments is of two types: economic and financial stabilization to ensure the country’s position in the international framework, but also a series of reformist actions that would be difficult to accept within the framework of partisan majorities.
This is a convenient method by which political forces can shirk direct responsibility for unpopular measures. For example, the pension reform in Italy was strongly driven by the measures taken by the Minister of Labour Elsa Fornero during the Monti government. It is also noted that these technical governments are the interpreters in Italy of a search for adequacy to the European framework, with the implementation of economic and social measures that correspond to the directives of the European Union.
Is Italian compromise possible in France?
It may seem legitimate to ask the question of the applicability of such a formula in the French context. The conditions of political crisis and the impossibility of finding a majority could lead to this. However, it is necessary to note differences which could constitute major obstacles.
In the Italian context, the role of the President of the Republic is that of a mediator, a leader who has a real share of initiative but who does so by guiding and coordinating the various political forces. The parties are and remain at the center of the political game.
The French case diverges. Even if the President of the Republic could find himself, after July 7, in a position of cohabitation, that is to say in the obligation to leave to a government and its leader the margin of power provided for by the Constitution in the conduct of policy, and therefore to take a step back from the interpretation of hyper-presidency noted since the reform of 2000, this return to the classic functions of the Prime Minister is not accompanied by a different method of appointment. A technical government cannot be a government of the President, which is no less of a challenge.
To get out of the trap of the parliamentary crisis and to project ourselves into a technical solution, a broad agreement is needed between the parties which must converge on a form of light coalition, or at least assent for parliamentary support even if one is not part of the government, which moreover can constitute an intelligent solution to protect the future.
This form of agreement requires spaces for mediation which are embodied by both individuals and institutions. Of course, a French president could completely interpret his role in this sense: he certainly has the power and the freedom. However, this seems to go against the institutional and cultural habits observed recently. Here again, the nature of the parliamentary support necessary for such a national unity coalition can only be achieved through close consultations with the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, who must be part of this type of solution.
An Italian way out of the French crisis could therefore exist, but it requires a strong evolution in terms of the culture of compromise and negotiation. This is certainly difficult, but could prove necessary.
