On all these subjects, America’s allies have a little time – until January – to build an “offer” to the new American leaders, on a naturally transactional basis. since this is apparently the basic philosophy of the former New York real estate developer. As an example, it is by making strong commitments on their military spending that Europeans can hold back Americans inclined to turn away from the defense of Europe. Such an approach does not exclude asserting “red lines” – on the need, for example, to allow a European defense industrial base or to have a differentiated approach to China. In the Middle East, opportunities may also open up, allowing Europeans to re-enter the game, something the Biden administration had little concern for.
Is such a program realistic? We can clearly see the limits: the temptation will be strong for a certain number of European capitals to engage in a scattered “race” to Washington to try to save their national interests. Building a European posture will not be self-evident, far from it. On the various subjects that we have mentioned, coalitions between certain Europeans – failing to bring together all the EU states – can however emerge. Regarding the most serious challenge, Ukraine, the most “Atlanticist” countries, at least in the East (Poland in particular) can adopt a posture of resistance to a possible American abandonment. France also has cards to play, such as making its offer to extend its nuclear umbrella to its neighbors more attractive by moving closer to NATO’s “Nuclear Planning Group”. If, furthermore, following the dismissal of the Minister of Finance, Germany were to move more quickly than expected to new elections leading to a new coalition, our room for maneuver to create a European front would be increased..
But does France, precisely, have an interest in playing collectively or, given the risks that no real European approach is possible, should it not also aim to preserve its interests by playing to the fullest on the relationship? bilateral with America? In reality, the difference between the two approaches is not so clear. What is true is that we will have all the more credit in Washington if we appear – at least on a certain number of subjects – as spokespersons for the whole of Europe. Do we still have enough weight within Europe to play such a role? The meetings which will take place in the coming days – European Political Community from November 7 and 8, European Council from December 19 and 20 – will provide the first elements of an answer to this question. Tactically, it would be in our interest, to better unite, to ban “European strategic autonomy” from our rhetoric…to better advance this in practice. Likewise, it would be very important to our partners that the two branches of the French Executive appear to be on the same wavelength in a strategy towards Washington. Taking into account Mr. Barnier’s personal equation, this would be a factor in a return of French influence in the EU.
Belgium