Any discussion on the subject of Western support for Ukraine usually begins in kyiv with a preamble-like expression of gratitude. Sitting at the table of a noisy café in the Ukrainian capital, the energetic opposition MP Solomiia Bobrovska this time chose to dispense with it: “We really have this impression that our allies are waiting for the moment when we can no longer fight and will say: ‘Okay, we did everything we could to support you, now you must negotiate on Russian conditions,’ sighs the elected official, member of the parliamentary committee on defense issues. When I go to international conferences, Western politicians always say the same things since 2022, that Ukraine wins, that we will rebuild Ukraine. But the problem is that Ukraine is losing, the Russians are on the offensive for months, and I don’t need to tell you the problems we risk facing this winter…”
Gratitude yes, but also more and more bitterness and frustration to characterize the perception of the Western role in Ukraine. With anxiety, kyiv has been observing for several weeks an American presidential campaign in which, reluctantly, the country has become one of the themes.
Against the backdrop of significant Russian advances in the Donbass, Volodymyr Zelensky has, this year, multiplied the setbacks in his quest for Western support: five months of delay at the start of the year for the vote in Washington on an important plan of aid, announcement by Berlin of support which will be halved in 2025, endless hesitation to authorize Ukrainian forces to strike Russian territory using Western missiles, or even a mixed reception of the plan for victory presented by Volodymyr Zelensky to all the major Western chancelleries this fall. Enough to tire out a country that is already more uncertain than ever about its future.
“Unfortunately, we are dependent on the United States”
“It’s not a disappointment,” assures, in an austere conference room of a hotel in the capital, Mykhaïlo Podoliak, advisor to the influential head of the presidential office. “But there is misunderstanding. I don’t understand this logic which says that the attacker could stop on his own without being punished. »
Frustration also of support subject to the electoral vagaries of Western countries: “There is this impression that any upcoming election can be a big problem for Ukraine, notes Ukrainian political scientist Yevhen Mahda. In the United States of course, but also in Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland…”
The beginnings of disillusionment are in fact found more widely among the Ukrainian population: the proportion of people thinking that “the West is tired of Ukraine and wants peace unfavorable to Ukraine” thus rose from 15% in September 2022 to 38% today, according to a survey by the International Institute of Sociology in kyiv.
“Western support is the cornerstone of Ukrainians’ optimism,” explains Anton Hroushetskiy, director of the Institute. In another poll conducted in August by the Razumkov Center, 40% of respondents said they thought the West would not support Ukraine. “in the long term », 39.5% thinking the opposite.
Increasingly pervasive in the discussions and declarations of Ukrainian decision-makers, this bitterness nevertheless remains largely confined to these same discussions, as Ukraine remains aware of the importance of Western support. And, a few weeks before the American presidential election, the leadership of Washington.
” Unfortunately, we are dependent on the United States, constate Solomiia Bobrovska. But the problem is that it will be complicated, no matter who is elected. Kamala Harris will undoubtedly continue Joe Biden’s policies, his tendency to very slow decision-making, and that is not a solution for us. » Because for kyiv, the challenge is to achieve an intensification, rather than a simple maintenance, of Western support in the coming months.
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Ukraine’s ‘victory plan’
The five axes of “victory plan” by Volodymyr Zelensky presented at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels:
1. Invite kyiv to join NATO.
2. Pump up the defense with the lifting of “restrictions on the use of long-range weapons throughout Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory and on Russian territory”. Supply of “real-time satellite data”.
3. Deployment in Ukraine of non-nuclear deterrents.
4. Allow allies to benefit from Ukraine’s economic growth potential.
5. Replace American military contingents in Europe after the war with Ukrainian units.
