By announcing, within a few hours of each other, the departure of French soldiers from their soil, Senegal and Chad formalized a “reorganization” that Paris had been preparing for a long time. But the form is catastrophic and, once again, benefits Russian influence.
On Thursday, these two historic partners expressed their desire to see the French army not reduce its strength on their respective territories, but leave the area.
Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye told AFP that his country’s “sovereignty” did not “(accommodate) the presence of military bases”, calling for a “stripped partnership” of French soldiers.
Shortly after, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot had just left N’Djamena as part of an African tour, his Chadian counterpart Abderaman Koulamallah announced “to put an end to the defense cooperation agreement” signed with Paris.
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After the forced departure in recent years of French soldiers from Mali, Burkina Faso and then Niger, where hostile juntas were established, Chad was the last Sahelian country to still host them.
These two declarations come as President Emmanuel Macron’s envoy to Africa, Jean-Marie Bockel, submitted his report on Monday on the reconfiguration of the French military system in Africa, advocating a “renewed” and “co-constructed” partnership.
The report “recommended a drastic reduction in presence. This is not necessarily what was initially requested by the partners. But the decisions were moving in this direction, they preferred to announce that the decision was theirs,” comments Elie Tenenbaum, of the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), for AFP.
The Chadian authorities are not satisfied “because the recommendations (of Jean-Marie Bockel, editor’s note) do not take into account their expectations”, judges Yamingué Bétinbaye, doctor in political geography at the University of N’Djamena.
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“Once again, the Africans have advanced faster than the French,” adds Elie Tenenbaum. In doing so, they offer Russia, in the midst of its surge in influence on the continent, a nice gift.
“Both Chad and Senegal have strengthened trade with Moscow in recent months. If Russia has no major interests in these countries, this is a good way for it to deal a blow to the French.”
An analysis reminiscent of statements to AFP last week by Chadian opponent Succès Masra. “There are many openly pro-Russian people in the presidency. Wagner is already there,” he assured, referring to the Russian mercenaries in Africa from the group of the late Yevgeni Prigojine, now grouped within the Africa Corps.
Chadian leaders “can free the French at any time, but everyone pretends that it doesn’t exist. The French themselves are burying their heads in the sand,” he said, noting that one month before the first legislative elections in the country since 2015, the announcement could help Mr. Deby “reconquer popular opinion.”
In fact, Paris seemed caught off guard. Neither the Elysée, nor the Quai d’Orsay, nor the Ministry of the Armed Forces had made any comments at midday. And the timing of the Chadian announcement, shortly after Jean-Noël Barrot took off, was disastrous, leaving those around him clearly taken aback on Friday.
In a supreme irony, the Elysée announced at the beginning of October that the French president and his Chadian counterpart, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, had agreed to “strengthen bilateral cooperation”.
For Wolfram Lacher, of the German think tank SWP, “it’s a page that is turning” for the former colonial power “after years of military support and while France has repeatedly saved the power” of the father of the Chadian leader, Idriss Déby.
“It’s a surprise (…), there was no need for Déby to take this step. He had a comfortable position with Paris.” And from now on, he “will need other external support to ensure the security of his regime”, even if he could “avoid a relationship of dependence with Moscow” by diversifying his support.
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The sequence refers to France’s inability to break the impasse and the opprobrium of African opinions, even since the end of the anti-jihadist operation Barkhane in the Sahel was announced in 2022 by Paris.
In January, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Thierry Burkhard admitted that the French “military system” produced “particularly in the field of perceptions of negative effects which end up weighing more heavily than the positive effects”.
And added: “It is imperative that we take the trouble to let sovereign partner countries communicate on their actions.”
This is done for two more of them. “It can be described as a slap in the face,” says Wolfram Lacher. “In 24 hours, Senegal and Chad… It shows the failure of French policy in Africa.”
Challenge (with AFP)
