As for civil society, there is a real collective challenge to strengthen our resistance to manipulation and influence operations, which have clearly intensified since 2015. Unlike technical cyberattacks, which we can counter with tools such as antivirus or protection systems, the fight against these manipulations relies more on the education of citizens, the media, and collective vigilance.
However, implementation remains very complex. Large platforms sometimes promote polarizing discourse, and this polarization makes the task even more complicated. It is a complex challenge, both technical and societal, which requires efforts to be strengthened and sustained.
In Romania, TikTok’s influence on the presidential election led to its annulment by judges. Is there a legal framework to invalidate an election in the event of proven manipulation?
This is an important question, and electoral law does indeed give judges some latitude to evaluate these situations on a case-by-case basis. That said, it is difficult to imagine that a situation like that of Romania would have exactly the same effects in France. We have mechanisms to detect these manipulations upstream.
There is a law adopted in 2018, after the election of Emmanuel Macron, to fight against information manipulation. But it is very difficult to apply, because it is based on a set of cumulative conditions which are complicated to prove. The legal framework is therefore limited. In reality, the main defense against these attempts at manipulation rests less on the law than on civil society and the media.
An interesting example is that of Macron Leaks in 2017. Two days before the runoff, 20,000 emails related to his campaign were made public by hackers. At the time, the French media had learned lessons from the 2016 American elections. When these documents were published, the reaction was very measured. We decided, at Mondenot to deal with the content of the documents immediately, but rather to analyze their origin and their timing, which were clearly aimed at destabilizing the vote. This caution on the part of the media made it possible to limit the impact of this attempt at destabilization.
This type of defense mechanism is often more effective than a legal decision, which would take too long. What raises questions, however, is France’s passivity in responding to these operations. During the Macron Leaksthere was almost no response from the State, apart from a few technical notes from the DGSE to warn. Today, we are starting to realize that responding directly in the information field could be more effective. Not letting yourself be walked on is perhaps a more pragmatic solution than sticking to confidential declarations or briefing notes.
In your book, you talk about the war in Ukraine – from 2014 – which showed how cyberspace can be used for technical sabotage and disinformation campaigns. In your eyes, how does this development redefine the space and duration of conflicts?
What is remarkable about Ukraine is that, although we tend to say that the war started in 2022, it actually began in 2014. It was already a real war, with trenches, artillery and deaths, even if it did not officially involve the Russian army. In this context, cyberattacks have become a constant tool, whether to spy on, sabotage or disrupt the Ukrainian state.
Since 2014, we have seen attacks targeting infrastructure, such as the electricity network, or operations to discredit institutions, for example hacking the electoral commission website to announce false results. The goal is not always to cause immediate damage, but to weaken the State. Even a power outage of a few hours in the middle of winter can be enough to give the impression that the government is incapable of managing the basic needs of its citizens.
Since 2022, we have observed continuity in the use of cyber weapons, combined with traditional military means. These tools are used to spy, disable certain infrastructures or disrupt communications. For example, the disconnection of a satellite used by the Ukrainian military had cascading effects on other installations across Europe.
Cyberspace also blurs physical and civil boundaries. A cyberattack often exploits vulnerabilities in systems designed by private companies, using their servers or software. This gives these companies an unexpected role in conflicts, sometimes at the same level as state actors. A striking example: it was Microsoft which detected the first signals of the Russian invasion, thanks to its global visibility on computer systems. This raises questions about the role of private companies in digital warfare.
