France and Lebanon are linked by a long-standing historical relationship which undoubtedly goes well beyond a simple relationship of a political nature, because it is imbued with a real emotional dimension. There is, on the part of France, a real attachment to the destiny of the “Land of the Cedar”.
Without going back very far, this is what was expressed during the impromptu visit of President Emmanuel Macron two days after the cataclysmic explosion at the port of Beirut, on August 4, 2020, which left some 220 people dead and 6,500 injured. As he indicated during this emblematic visit: “I come first, I would say almost immediately, to bring a testimony of support, friendship, fraternal solidarity to the Lebanese people. »
France alongside Lebanon?
With this solemn promise: “I will not let Lebanon collapse, much less disappear”while calling for “a profound change” in Lebanese governance. A cryptic way of urging the Lebanese parties to review the functioning of their political system which has led the country to the limit of a “failed state”, both economically and politically.
The expectations of the Lebanese were then immense. Two years later, President Emmanuel Macron renewed this “France’s unwavering commitment alongside Lebanon”. But this expectation of the Lebanese population was largely jeopardized by the systematic obstruction of the parties occupying the Lebanese chessboard to accomplish the necessary structural reforms demanded for a long time.
The limits of a proactive French posture
We can recall that the CEDRE Conference (Economic Conference for Development through Reforms and for Businesses) organized on April 6, 2018 in Paris – as a continuation of the so-called Paris I, Paris II, and especially Paris III Conferences on June 25 2007 organized in support of Lebanon by President Jacques Chirac to help the “land of the Cedar” to rebuild itself after the “33-day war” (July 12-August 14) of 2006 – conditioned the granting of financial assistance of nearly $11 billion for the implementation of budgetary and sectoral reforms.
All things which could not be implemented due to the inertia of the Lebanese political system which President Emmanuel Macron had not failed to harshly stigmatize, in vain. In any case, this demonstrated the limits of the French proactive posture in Lebanon, but also more generally in the Levant.
Limits undoubtedly inherent in the insidious downgrading of its geopolitical status in the region and perhaps in the lack of readability specific to the Macronian “at the same time” which we were able to measure thanks to the Palestinian problem returning to the forefront of the regional scene in the wake of the October 7 pogrom perpetrated by Hamas, directly at the origin of the war in Gaza.
Loss of French credibility and influence
It is notable that, in an unprecedented gesture in the recent history of French diplomacy in the Arab world, around ten French ambassadors to the Maghreb as well as to the Near and Middle East had taken the initiative of drafting and sign in November 2023 a missive addressed to the Quai d’Orsay with recipients at the Élysée.
This regretted a supposed pro-Israeli turn by Emmanuel Macron in the war led by the Hebrew State in Gaza, which would break with the traditional French position of balance and would partly explain a loss of credibility and influence. of France in the Arab world, which would be fueled by a degraded image of France in the region.
It remains that this loss of credibility and influence highlighted is perhaps also largely the result of a form of progressive downgrading in terms of power. France – notwithstanding its seat as a permanent member with a right of veto on the UN Security Council – is undoubtedly no longer the great middle power that it was for a long time, but rather a middle power tout court which does not he no longer necessarily has the means – notably with more than 3,000 billion in debt – of its ambitions, if not its pretensions in view of the otherwise accelerated evolution of the international system.
The United States powerless
It is obviously not the only power concerned, but others have perhaps more fully recognized this new reality, certainly uncomfortable for a country like ours which often takes on a historic role.
And, as far as the Levant is concerned, France no longer really seems able to exert the influence it would legitimately wish to do. We saw this with the French proposal relating to a withdrawal of the presence of Hezbollah to move it away from the “blue line” serving as an uncertain border between Israel and Lebanon as explicitly stipulated in Security Council resolution 1701 passed on August 11, 2006 to put an end to the war of summer 2006.
Even the United States, the world’s leading power, and despite all the efforts undertaken during the multiple shuttles of Amos Hochtein, President Biden’s special envoy, did not succeed. That’s saying something.
