Why Russia decided to evolve its nuclear doctrine

Moscow decided, Wednesday, September 25, to revise its nuclear doctrine, in order to adapt it to the new context of the war in Ukraine. This was announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation devoted to this subject, including a summary was made public. This is a new step, because until now the head of the Kremlin had mainly increased declaratory threats.

Russian nuclear doctrine – the last public version of which dates from 2020 – only provided that Russia could use its own arsenal in the event of a nuclear attack or a conventional attack. “threatening the existence of the State”. This time, Mr. Putin wanted a “aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear State, but with the participation or support of a nuclear State, is considered an joint attack against the Russian Federation ». The reference to Ukraine and its ongoing offensive in the Kursk region, on Russian territory, is obvious.

The future doctrine should also provide that Russia will now be able to use nuclear weapons “if it received reliable information about the start of a massive cross-border attack by air, using strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones and hypersonic weapons”declared Mr. Putin. This mention is directly linked to the current negotiations between the West and Ukraine on the delivery of long-range weapons. On Thursday, September 26, American President Joe Biden only announced the sending to kyiv of gliding bombs with a limited range – from 20 to 130 kilometers.

Finally, the future doctrine could mention for the first time, in black and white, the fact that Belarus is now under the umbrella of Russian deterrence. “We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of l’union »specified Vladimir Putin. This declaration is consistent with the announced arrival, on Belarusian soil, since June 2023, of nuclear warheads, which would be the first Moscow’s deployment of nuclear weapons outside Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Ammunition depots reached

“To be operational, this evolution of doctrine must still be validated by a presidential decree. Furthermore, as stated, it does not formally constitute a lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, specifies Héloïse Fayet, specialist in deterrence issues at the French Institute of International Relations. On the other hand, the conditions of employment to preventively deal with a threat are broadened, because, previously, only the threat of ballistic missiles was taken into account in the definition of these thresholds, not a possible large-scale air attack.she adds.

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