In Mozambique, the opposition has been demonstrating relentlessly for more than two months. In Kenya, thousands of demonstrators forced the government six months ago to back down on a proposed new tax, without any precise political directives. Do these events signal new forms of popular mobilization in East Africa? And in this context, do the young protesters manage to free themselves from the tutelage of political parties, which often confine them to their ethnic affiliation? Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, former director of the French Institute for Research in Africa in Nairobi and currently professor at Paris 1 University, sheds light on these social and political dynamics.
RFI: Are the riots of recent days in Mozambique, as well as the major demonstrations last June in Kenya, a sign of a new mobilization of youth in several East African countries?
Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle: Indeed, we had very intense episodes of mobilization in Kenya, linked to a tax law, and there in Mozambique to contest the electoral results. These are different triggering events, but indeed these are young people who are demanding to participate more in the political debate.
In Kenya, there was a democratic change a little over two years ago, in September 2022. However, 20 months later, the youth took to the streets. For what ?
Mainly to protest against the finance law which increased taxes on basic necessities such as bread and oil. The youth, strangled by problems such as unemployment and inflation, decided that it was time to challenge this type of tax policy. A youth who also decided to take to the streets to denounce the betrayal of the new democratically elected President William Ruto. He was elected on a program particularly aimed at young people, promising them assistance to ensure that they find employment. And obviously that didn’t happen, he raised taxes. So there was a feeling of betrayal among those who had believed in this democratically elected president in 2022.
So these are the same young people who voted for Ruto in 2022 and shouted “ Ruto must go » in 2024?
Indeed, the analysis of the 2022 elections clearly highlighted the fact that young people from all over the country, and not just in its usual electoral strongholds, had voted for this president. He put forward the idea that Kenya should help the “ hustlers “, he even spoke of a ” hustler nation ”, which can be translated as “the resourceful ones”. He really wanted to emphasize the idea that young people should create their own businesses and that the state would help them. These are indeed the same young people who found themselves on the streets in June 2024. There were of course very educated young people, Kenya has an education policy which is relatively effective, but also less advantaged young people coming from the slums of Nairobi. . So quite diverse young people who found themselves in the streets and who denounced this tax policy which was strangling them, even though we had promised to help them.
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As a result, William Ruto abandoned his tax reform. In the history of Kenya, there have already been several episodes of insurrection. Until then, they often relied on ethnic divisions. This year, was it the same or not?
What made this movement original was that the young people claimed to be “ partyless » et « tribeless “, that is to say not being attached to a party or an ethnic affiliation. They claimed a cosmopolitanism that we observe in the large and medium-sized towns of Kenya, where young people from all regions come together to look for work. This rejection of the usual ethnic divisions was evident in the scale of the protests, which took place not only in Nairobi, but also in pro-government strongholds like the Rift Valley. This movement expressed a united youth, betrayed by elites who confiscated power.
Was this mobilization carried out by social networks?
Yes, particularly in Kenya, which is a digital hub in Africa, social networks play a fundamental role in daily life, whether for paying via a mobile or for getting organized. They made it possible to coordinate demonstrations, broadcast gathering places, and host political debates, notably on WhatsApp and Space X “, for example, have become forums where often marginalized voices can express themselves in a relatively horizontal and secure framework.
So, in Kenya, there is a strong mobilization outside the political parties, while in Mozambique, can we speak of a movement supported by the political parties?
Yes, absolutely. The originality of the mobilization in Kenya was this exteriority in relation to the usual political parties. In Mozambique, it was a post-election protest which effectively attracted large crowds, particularly young people. But we can clearly see that she is doing so after having been incited by the opposition candidate who himself is no longer in Mozambique and who is calling for peaceful demonstrations to contest the electoral results.
In Mozambique, it is also a challenge to the all-powerful FRELIMO, the party in power since independence in 1975. Do these mobilizations call into question the legacy of the fathers of independence?
So indeed, in Mozambique, we find traces of this protest against the heroes of independence, a statue of one of the heroes of independence was recently torn down in Mozambique. This figure, who played a crucial role in the liberation, is also accused of having enriched himself thanks to power. And indeed, even in Kenya, even in Uganda, we can see that there is a form of fatigue with these political elites who are the direct descendants of those who actually won independence or took power. in the name of the revolution. This is the case in Uganda, and the case in Tanzania. In Kenya, leaders still regularly claim to be part of the Mau Mau fight. And what the young protesters show is that these leaders have nevertheless betrayed their fight which was that of true independence, since one of the registers on which these protests play is to denounce dependence on ‘outside. Dependence on China, dependence on Westerners, a register that we know well in French-speaking Africa, particularly with regard to French African policy. But we also find, in East Africa, the idea that independence has not been completely achieved.
Does this rise in anti-French sentiment in West Africa find an equivalent in East Africa, with a rise in anti-Chinese sentiment?
The story is not equivalent, but this feeling of dependence on the outside and especially dependence on elites is also present in East Africa. And this common register of sovereignty is also found among the youth of East Africa.
Young people took to the streets in Kenya, but not in Uganda or Tanzania. Does this mean there are fewer problems in these two countries?
So young people took to the streets in Uganda, following the movement that took place in Kenya in June. There was a form of imitation of what was happening in Kenya, because obviously the problems are also numerous, particularly on questions of corruption. However, in Tanzania as in Uganda, civic space is very limited. The slightest protest gives rise to arrests and very strong repression. The public space, due to this authoritarian history, still very strong in Tanzania and Uganda, is less likely to give rise to strong mobilizations than in neighboring Kenya.
And is this why the Ugandan regime captured, a month ago in Kenya, the leader of the opposition, Kizza Besigye, who is due to be court-martialed on January 7 in Kampala?
This is indeed a sign that the Ugandan government is very sensitive to the slightest opposition. It is also a sign that the Kenyan government is very close to this Ugandan power, to the point of giving it the freedom to come and kidnap an opponent from home in Kenya. This is something that is strongly denounced by Ugandan and Kenyan civil societies, who see an alliance of extremely authoritarian powers.
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