If yesterday, after some sources cited by Reuters announced that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was traveling to Cairo, the agreement for the ceasefire in Gaza seemed imminent, today the agreement between Israel and Hamas still appears probable, but subject to the resolution of some significant gaps, which remain. The head of the CIA, William Burns, traveled to Doha for a meeting with the Prime Minister of Qatar, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, in an attempt to bridge these gaps between the demands of Israel and those of the Gaza militia. According to Israeli and Arab media, the negotiations are at a crucial stage, however, “the final details remain to be defined”. To take stock of the progress towards the agreement for the truce in Gaza and the release of the hostages, Huffpost interviewed Aaron David Miller, a great expert on the Middle East at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former negotiator in the Arab-Israeli peace process, advisor for the Middle East policies of American secretaries of state, both Republican and Democrat.
Aaron David Miller, what stage are the negotiations for the agreement on Gaza at?
I think the agreement is closer than ever, but I equally believe that there are several significant gaps outstanding, which still need to be filled and which, if not managed properly, also have the potential to derail the agreement. The gaps concern the names and numbers of Israeli hostages to be released, and the names and numbers of Palestinian prisoners the Israelis are ready to release. And then there is the enormous problem of the complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and therefore the end of the war in the Strip…
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have no intention of completing the second phase of the agreement, which involves a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.
Exact. It is important to underline that we are still talking about a limited agreement, which will not end the war. It is an agreement that provides for a limited exchange of hostages. The draft agreement includes three phases. In the first phase, Hamas will release men over 50, women, the elderly, children – if there are still any – the sick, in exchange for a 45-60 day ceasefire. But the militia will hold the rest of the hostages, around 50 or more, and the war will continue. The problem, in fact, is in the transition from the first – when a limited quantity of hostages are released – to the second phase of the agreement, in which there should be the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Here, Netanyahu has no reason to definitively stop the war, he will not give a political victory to Hamas. Honestly, at this moment, looking at the information we have, I don’t see any solution to the problem of how to end the conflict in Gaza.
One of the central issues of the negotiations are the hostages still imprisoned in the Strip. Might Hamas be able to give the mediators a list of all the hostages, clarifying how many are alive and how many are not and specifying where they are?
We don’t know. First of all, the answer to your question is that we don’t know, and the Israelis, above all, don’t know. It is estimated that there are 97 hostages between alive and dead in Gaza, the dead hostages could be between 30 and 40, which means that the living hostages, again according to estimates, could be around 60. And I suspect that the live hostages are not held in central locations in the Strip, but were moved to remote locations to hide them from the Israelis. I also think they were divided among themselves and assigned to different Palestinian groups, including Islamic Jihad. There are Palestinian families, Palestinian clans that could hold them. Proof of the hostages’ lives is still the big issue that essentially prevents the deal. And I believe it is one of those gaps, which, if not resolved, will delay or perhaps even undermine the prospects of an agreement.
It is equally true that, despite the gaps to be filled, there is concrete progress in the negotiations. Yet, just a few weeks ago, as you yourself told me in an interview, neither Israel nor Hamas seemed willing to engage in negotiations. What has changed?
Well, it created a sense of urgency that wasn’t there before. Negotiations in wars are usually successful when there is a sense of urgency felt by both actors. The pressure on Hamas is now enormous: the Gaza militia has been severely weakened militarily in the northern and central parts of the Strip; it was abandoned by both Hezbollah and Iran; and has absolutely nothing left to show the Palestinian population, after it has inflicted nothing but destruction and misery on 2.3 million people in the Strip by placing its military resources in and around the civilian population. Hamas was unable to demonstrate to the Palestinian people that its attack on Israel on October 7 in any way benefited the population. So Hamas urgently needs an agreement and a ceasefire.
Aaron David Miller: “Trump will not affect Gaza, he will give in on the West Bank, he will ignore Lebanon”
by Nadia Boffa
Netanyahu also seems more inclined towards an agreement.
Netanyahu, on the other hand, is certainly more willing than before to reach an agreement, he is not under as much pressure, but he is more in favor of an agreement. Partly because the Israelis have demonstrated, in the last two months, a certain degree of military superiority over both Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, which has strengthened the Israeli prime minister’s political prospects. Netanyahu – and this is another important element – also wants to be reactive towards the new American administration of Donald Trump.
What does he mean?
The Israeli prime minister, taking advantage of Trump’s inauguration, wants to focus Israel’s attention not on Gaza, but on Iran, because he clearly sees the opportunity to destroy Iranian nuclear sites before him. All these factors, combined together, have created perhaps the best opportunity there has been so far to reach an agreement on Gaza.
In our last interview, immediately after the American elections, he told me that Trump, in his opinion, would not push for a ceasefire agreement in Gaza. About three days ago, however, there was a phone call between Netanyahu and the president-elect of the USA. Why is Trump pushing for this agreement?
Trump pushes because he doesn’t like losers and doesn’t want to have any more major turmoil to resolve. The American president wants to spread the message that thanks to his expected return to Washington the conflict in Gaza will also be resolved. But mind you, Trump is not the main reason why Hamas is on the verge of making some changes to its negotiating position. Hamas is under pressure for military reasons and certainly not for the threatening statements Trump made in the phone call with Netanyahu. Of course, in Netanyahu’s mind there is the prospect of making work in the Middle East easier for Trump, who inherited a region with important and complicated challenges to overcome. But I believe that even if Trump were already in office now, he would not be the fundamental factor in reaching the agreement. The two contenders feel a sense of urgency which, as I have already said, depends above all on other factors. In summary, Trump is not the main driving force behind why we find ourselves on the threshold of a limited agreement.
Even once the agreement was signed, the big problem for the future government of Gaza would remain. Do you see a solution?
No, I don’t see it at all. To stabilize and secure Gaza there is a need for the coexistence of various elements, which are not present at the moment. The first is a clear commitment from key Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, not only to pay for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Gaza, but to participate in some kind of stabilizing security force. But the Arab states will do no such thing until there is a commitment from Israel to link Gaza to the much larger question of establishing a Palestinian state. Element number two would be the presence of a reformed and functioning Palestinian National Authority, and instead the PNA is incredibly weak, even more so than months ago and it seems to me that it has neither the capacity nor any political legitimacy to govern Gaza. The third element would be Israel’s desire to leave the Strip and instead it is enough to read the Israeli press to understand that day by day the Israeli settlements in northern Gaza are increasing, Israel is demolishing Palestinian homes and is making it impossible for Hamas to use weapons at sight directly against Israeli communities. We must also remember another element…
Which?
Hamas, weak as it is, will likely survive as a very important political player in Gaza. It will no longer be able to govern the Strip, but it will be able to maintain its influence over the area through intimidation and collaboration with local leaders. The central issue seems to me to be that there is no type of overall strategy on Gaza, neither on the part of Israel, nor the PNA, nor the Arab countries, nor the United States, nor Europe. And instead here we need all actors to join a strategy to make Gaza better than it was before this war. I honestly don’t see how this could happen.
Also because, in parallel with what is happening in Gaza, the normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia seems to be at a standstill. Yesterday Haaretz wrote that the two countries have reached a turning point towards normalization, but the news was denied by Netanyahu’s office and by official Saudi sources.
I believe the agreement is frozen and I see very little chance, at this time, of it making any progress. The Saudis have their own economic objectives and continue to draw their red lines for reaching the agreement, which would be linked to the creation of a Palestinian state in particular. It may very well be that Trump, in the coming months, pushes towards the signing of an agreement. But certainly, at the moment, there has been no breakthrough in the negotiations.
Closer than ever. Convergences in Cairo and Doha for an agreement on Gaza
by Nadia Boffa
