NASA officials postponed the second phase of the program Artemisscheduled for November 2024, to September 2025; Artemis III should follow a year later. These deadlines seem longer than initially announced. Is this surprising or normal for a project of this scale?
We must distinguish the official communication from NASA, often optimistic, from the reality of the projects. From this point of view, these delays are not a surprise. As early as 2021, NASA’s inspector general had expressed doubts about the feasibility of the dates initially announced. Political and budgetary constraints often encourage the communication of ambitious objectives, even if it means adjusting them gradually afterwards. This situation is not unique to the American space agency; Similar phenomena are observed in many large, complex projects, whether space or terrestrial.
More generally, the current context differs significantly from that of the program Apollo. The allocated budgets are significantly lower, in proportion to American GDP, than those of the 1960s, because the issue of returning to the Moon is obviously no longer as central today. Another factor explaining these delays is the loss of specific skills. Since 1972, no human has set foot on lunar soil. Although the archives have been meticulously preserved, many know-how must be rediscovered or adapted to current technologies. Here again, this is not specific to space, the same phenomenon has been invoked to explain the delay of the Flamanville EPR for example.
We must also understand that these space projects are extraordinarily complex, involving thousands of engineers and technicians. Each stage of the program must be carefully planned and executed, and the slightest problem at one stage can cause significant delays on all subsequent stages, contributing to schedules slipping. Especially since the safety of astronauts is an issue that is much more closely watched today than during the Cold War. [voir l’article page 26]which further increases the number of tests and verifications at each stage.
Shouldn’t the reuse of certain existing technologies have accelerated the process?
Paradoxically, this is not necessarily the case. Adapting technologies designed in other contexts, such as space shuttles, to a lunar mission brings its own challenges. THE Space Launch System, d’Artemisfor example, reuses RS-25 engines, initially designed in the 1970s for the space shuttles. Although these motors are proven, their integration with new control systems and technologies is likely to create unexpected incompatibilities, requiring additional adjustments and testing. Thus, it is not always easy to determine whether it is more efficient and more economical to adapt existing technologies or to develop new ones.
What is Space X’s role in the program Artemis ?
Space X won a crucial contract for the lunar lander, an adapted version of its ship Starship. This bold choice by NASA offers potentially greater capabilities, but also introduces new technical challenges, such as refueling in orbit. This is a major difference from the program Apollowhere private sector involvement was less. Today, entire sections of the program are outsourced to private companies.
The choice of Space X represents a bet on innovation and cost reduction. THE Starshipif it functions as designed, will offer a payload capacity far greater than that of the lunar module ofApollo. However, this approach is not without risks. Space In addition, refueling in orbit, necessary for the lunar mission, is a technology that has never been tested on this scale. These challenges could cause additional delays to the program.
What are the main motivations for this return to the Moon for the United States?
The “Moon to Mars” objective, formulated in 2009 in the Augustine commission report, remains the guideline. Mars remains the ultimate destination, and the Moon is considered a necessary step. It must also be understood that space combines issues of hard power and of soft power. The economic, geopolitical and military aspects are preponderant, although less publicized than civil applications or manned exploration.
The return to the Moon allows the United States to maintain its leadership in space exploration, particularly in the face of the rise of China. It is also a way to stimulate technological innovation and maintain a cutting-edge industrial and scientific base in the space sector. Economically, the program Artemis provides positions for highly qualified profiles and stimulates the development of technologies that can have terrestrial applications.
Even more, NASA encourages the creation of a commercial ecosystem around the Moon, in particular with the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. From this point of view, the station Lunar Gatewayintended for lunar orbit, constitutes one of the big differences between the programs Artemis et Apollo. By offering a transit point and a place of experimentation between the Earth and the Moon, it is presented as an ingredient in the sustainability of the return to the Moon. The idea is not to repeat what happened with the rushed end of the program Apolloand the half-century absence of the Moon that followed.
And for other nations, like China, what are the issues?
For China, it is first of all a question of demonstrating its technological mastery by achieving what the United States accomplished more than fifty years ago. It’s a question of prestige and skill development. China is actively developing its own lunar program with a gradual, long-term approach, which has already seen the success of missions like Chang’e 4 and, very recently, Chang’e 6 on the far side of the Moon.
The Chinese lunar program is part of a broader strategy aimed at asserting China’s status as a leading space power, which also involves the desire to build international partnerships, particularly with countries in the Global South which have not traditionally been involved in space exploration. Unlike the United States, which announces its ultimate goal of Mars, China is pragmatically focusing more on the Moon itself.
The “European service module” (here in the Airbus hangars in Bremen, in 2022) of the Orion spacecraft, which houses electrical power and control systems, vital fluids and propulsion systems, was developed by European companies.
© Nasa
It is therefore entirely conceivable that by 2030 we will witness the simultaneous arrival on the Moon of two distinct and competing manned programs: Artemisled by the United States and its traditional allies, and the Chinese program with its new partners. This situation could exacerbate rivalries, as during the race for the Moon, although the issues and the context are very different from those of the 1960s.
We often hear about mining and space tourism as potential economic benefits. What do you think?
Lunar mining seems unrealistic to me in the short term. The Moon does not have concentrated deposits like those found on Earth, due to the absence of geological processes like plate tectonics. As a result, extraction would require the processing of colossal quantities of lunar regolith for potentially low yields. Additionally, the technical challenges are considerable and the costs of transporting the necessary equipment and extracted materials would be prohibitive with current technologies.
Lunar tourism is undoubtedly much easier to implement, since it is based on the same technologies as those used for the return of astronauts to the Moon. It is likely that it will be limited to flybys without staying on the surface, the moon landing being the most complex and costly stage. Although space tourism generates some media interest, it will in any case remain reserved for an extremely wealthy elite, which raises legitimate criticism.
In reality, the economic benefits of returning to the Moon are more to be found on Earth. It is in fact more likely that they come from the development of new technologies and their application in terrestrial sectors, or quite simply from the knock-on effect of the program in the growth of the commercial space sector in low Earth orbit, such as telecommunications and Earth observation.
What is the place of Europe in the program Artemis ?
Europe provides crucial technological elements, in particular in exchange for places for its astronauts: it has negotiated three places for its astronauts on missions Artemisalthough at this stage these are missions to the space station Lunar Gateway rather than moon landings – there is no guarantee that a European will set foot on the lunar soil as part ofArtemisat least initially. Europe’s contribution is no less significant, particularly through the capsule’s service module. Orionwhich is entirely developed and built in Europe. This module is crucial because it provides propulsion, electricity, and thermal control to the capsule Orion.
There is also a European desire to have its own spatial vision, distinct from that of the United States. For example, ESA proposed a “lunar village” concept a few years ago. However, budgetary and political constraints make it difficult to carry out such a project without international partners. Europe must therefore navigate between its desire for autonomy and the need for international cooperation, while seeking to maximize the scientific and economic benefits of its participation in space programs.
How are decisions made regarding these major space programs? Are citizens consulted?
The decision-making process varies by country. In the United States, NASA proposes programs, but it is Congress that decides on budgetary allocations. In Europe, decisions are mainly made at the ESA, where each member country has weight proportional to its financial contribution. However, these decisions are often the result of complex negotiations between Member States, each seeking to maximize the benefits for their national industry.
It is true that the general public is rarely directly consulted on these issues. This is partly explained by the technical complexity of the issues, but also by a certain tradition of leaving these decisions to experts and politicians. However, in the era of global challenges such as climate change, one could argue that a broader public debate on the use we collectively wish to have of space would be beneficial, especially since space exploration fascinates and that players in the sector exploit this fascination to promote their activities, the concrete repercussions of which are not always obvious.
