What will Donald Trump's second term change for American allies in Asia? Whether Taiwan, Japan or South Korea, all these countries congratulated the winner of the US presidential elections, wishing that the close alliance with Washington would continue and strengthen in the future. But the fear is there: during his campaign, the isolationist Donald Trump recalled that Asian countries taking advantage of the American protection “umbrella” should instead rely on themselves. And he notably urged Taiwan to pay to defend itself against China. The geopolitics expert, Emmanuel Véron, associate professor-researcher at Inalco, responds to Heike Schmidt.
RFI: With Donald Trump in the White House, should the island of Taiwan fear losing its most important ally to an increasingly threatening China? ?
Emmanuel Véron: Taiwan is an absolutely fundamental subject in the Sino-American rivalry, particularly in view of the daily Chinese pressures. And in this context, let us recall the maintenance over time of American security guarantees, in particular the Taiwan Relations Act which was signed and dictated in 1979. Since 1979, this legal framework and support for American guarantees has been maintained with a certain agility over time, with training, equipment, because the Chine aims to neutralize this type of support. Now, indeed, the Trump administration will look at the links of interdependence, notably on microprocessors, semiconductors and advanced Taiwanese technologies, without abandoning Taiwan. The U.S. administration has no interest in abandoning Taiwan and strategically favoring a China that wants to completely surpass American power within 5 to 10 years. So, we have this game where Taiwan is a bit the center of gravity of this Sino-American relationship.
And what about Donald Trump's threat to charge more for American weapons delivered to Taiwan?
The subject of amounts in trade, and particularly in military support, was discussed. The question is obviously under negotiation. But behind it, what is interesting, is the strategic backdrop where there is a particularly strong interest in guaranteeing security and supporting Taiwan in its singularity in international relations.
However, can China hope for American disengagement from the Indo-Pacific to strengthen its control over this region?
When we look at the first mandate of Donald Trumpthere is the installation of a real subject, of a real policy vis-à-vis China, and in particular through the strengthening of strategic-military alliances in the Asia-Pacific with Japan, Korea from the South, Taiwan which we mentioned, but also from the Philippines. That means strengthening joint exercises, strengthening diplomatic ties, including in the field of intelligence, in short, because it is a strategic-military priority for the UNITED STATES. And so it's hard to see the Trump administration returning to these subjects. So, on the contrary, we must closely observe the strengthening of these same links with a complement of militarization, a complement of intelligence with these poles of Asian power which are Japan, South Korea or intermediate countries like the Philippines associated with which we will find Australia and India, and we come here to new “minilateralism”, from international organizations such as Aukuswhich are strategic-military and commercial partnerships.
