Two forces, both allies and competitors, have been on the offensive since Thursday, November 28. First there is a coalition of groups, refugees in Idlib, the last region which escaped the reconquest in 2018 of rebel strongholds (Ghouta, Deraa, etc.) by the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. At the head of this coalition is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the most powerful group with 15,000 fighters, led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani.
This 40-year-old radical Islamist is a former leader of al-Qaeda in Syria, who broke eight years ago with the terrorist group and the idea of transnational jihad against the West, to focus on a purely Syrian agenda. HTS is waging war against the clandestine cells of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State group, who killed one of its relatives, Abu Maria al Qahtani, on April 4, 2024.
In Idlib, Jolani installed a civilian administration and added “wine to the water” of his radical agenda to conciliate a population that had rebelled several times.
And the other offensive force?
The Syrian National Army (SNA) is another coalition of groups, ranging from Islamists to “secularists.” Founded in 2017, placed directly under the control of Turkey, its army and its special services, the ANS occupies border regions of northern Syria. More than the Assad regime, its objective is the fight against the YPG, the Syrian version of the PKK, the Kurdish separatists of Türkiye. Since the fall of the Islamic State group's “caliphate” in 2019, the YPG has occupied eastern Syria with the support of the West, particularly the United States.
Where are we?
To everyone's surprise, the HTS coalition captured Aleppo, Syria's second city, in less than 48 hours. Simultaneously, HTS attacked southward, pursuing Assad's regular army to Hama, on the road to Homs and Damascus.
Mounted on 4x4s, very mobile, the HTS fighters were unable to hold Hama, due to lack of heavy resources. Since then, Assad's army has managed to stabilize the front there. Reinforcements are pouring in, notably Shiite militiamen arriving from Lebanon or Iraq at the request of Iran, the main ally of the Syrian regime. The other ally, Russia, is increasing its air sorties.
The battle for Hama promises to be crucial. For Assad, but also for Tehran and Moscow, there is no question of losing this region and that of Homs. They connect the capital Damascus to the Mediterranean coast, where the Russian air (Hmeimim) and maritime (Tartous) bases are located, as well as the Alawite stronghold of Latakia. A branch of Shiism, Alawism is the confession of the Assads who did everything to transform the popular protest of 2011 into a civil war on ethnic and religious grounds.
And the Kurds?
Surprised by the HTS offensive, the YPG, which controlled the Kurdish district of Aleppo and villages north of the city, tried to come to their aid. YPG fighters advanced from eastern Syria, but the maneuver failed. HTS and especially the ANS, in the service of the Turks, took control of the Kurdish enclaves.
Jolani, who launched a solemn appeal to his troops to respect minorities (Christians, Kurds, etc.) negotiated an evacuation of Kurdish fighters to the East. But that did not prevent ANS and Turkish special services from assassinating several Kurdish officials.
Why this explosion after five years of relative calm?
The Idlib coalition led by HTS has never given up the fight against a hated regime. She can give up all the less since two thirds of the three million inhabitants there are refugees who want to return home. In Atmeh, near the Turkish border, a huge canvas camp, one of the largest in the world, accommodates tens of thousands of displaced people. A pool of fighters.
In this context, the war in Gaza and especially in Lebanon offered an opportunity. Israeli bombings in Syria, against Lebanese Hezbollah and militias under the orders of Iran, have deeply disorganized support for the Assad regime. Tehran had its head in Lebanon, Moscow had other fish to fry in Ukraine…
The decisive factor was Turkey's tacit green light for the HTS offensive.
Why did Turkey agree?
The Turkish president has acknowledged the failure of his attempts over two years to normalize relations with Bashar al-Assad. In exchange for an end to his support for the Syrian rebels, Erdogan hoped to send home the four million Syrians who had taken refuge in his country for ten years, while keeping his hands free to punish the Kurdish YPG. Assad refused, demanding a withdrawal of the Turkish army and its ANS proxies. Ankara has chosen to take action.
