Twenty years after the bombing of Bouaké and these few days when France and Ivory Coast came close to war, two journalists carry out their investigation

The sequence of events is known, but who gave the triggering order? Twenty years ago, on November 6, 2004, at 1:20 p.m., two Sukhoi-25s of the Ivorian army bombed a French base installed in the Descartes high school in Bouaké, killing 9 French soldiers from Operation “Licorne” and one American agricultural engineer and injured 38 people. In the hour that followed, General Henri Poncet, boss of the “Licorne” force, which acts as a buffer between the loyalist forces and the Forces Nouvelles rebels, launched the French response. The two fighter planes were destroyed on the tarmac of Yamoussoukro airport.

Then Jacques Chirac gave his agreement for the destruction of the entire Ivorian air fleet, annihilating any possibility of success for Operation “Dignity”, launched by Laurent Gbagbo, the then president with whom relations were execrable, for reconquer the north of the country.

While the streets in Abidjan, heated by Radio Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI), are set ablaze against France, its businesses, its nationals, several French detachments stationed in the north of the country come back down urgently, pulverizing the roadblocks of the “young patriots “. On the bridges of the Ivorian economic capital, French helicopters prevent the passage of these supporters of Laurent Gbagbo with barrages.

In front of the Ivoire Hotel, on November 9, where thousands of them gathered to, they say, prevent France's overthrow of their president after armored vehicles positioned themselves near his residence, but also effectively blocking the evacuation of French nationals, French soldiers fired. The Ivorian authorities at the time announced a toll of 57 dead and 2,226 injured, but did not initiate any proceedings.

“Extraordinary legal fiasco”

In April 2021, the trial before the Paris Assize Court of the bombing of Bouaké took place in the absence of the Belarusian pilots and Ivorian co-pilots and did not provide any response to the families of the victims. It is also a state affair on which none of the successive governments, in Paris or Abidjan, has lifted the veil.

During these few days when France and the Ivory Coast came close to open war, two journalists, Emmanuel Leclère, senior reporter at France Inter, and Thomas Hofnung, head of the international service at the newspaper The Cross, after following for Liberation African and defense issues, have each just published a book twenty years after the fact. With these same basic questions: who gave the order to the Ivorian air force to drop rockets on the French base, clearly identifiable from the air, and thus precipitate events? Why did the investigation in France result in “an extraordinary legal fiasco”as Emmanuel Leclère says in his book Bouake. High state treason (New World, 312 pages, 19.90 euros)?

The latter, after having had access to the judicial file, draws up a list of the dysfunctions of the investigation, in particular the case of the Belarusian pilots, arrested in Togo on November 16, 2004, placed at the disposal of France which will let them leave without issuing arrest warrant. So many elements which feed the theory of French manipulation, defended by the lawyer for the families of the French victims, Jean Balan, but on which the journalist remains reserved.

The French strategy would, according to this thesis, have been to “make people believe that their strengths [ivoiriennes] were guilty of an attack against France » to provide “a pretext to overthrow Laurent Gbagbo”. “According to this version, if we did nothing to bring justice back to the sponsors, it is because they were not in Ivory Coast but in France. » Emmanuel Leclère does not agree with this hypothesis, but asks the questions left unanswered: “Who is compromised in the bombing? If this is realpolitik, what are the stakes? »

“Succession of errors and improvisations”

The second, Thomas Hofnung, stayed for a fortnight in Abidjan in November 2004. He recounts in his book Bouake. The last cold case of Françafrique (Fayard, 250 pages, 20.90 euros), the city turned upside down, the panic of the French, but also the trial of 2021. He also leads the investigation, detailing in particular the dissensions between French soldiers. The journalist says he does not believe in the conspiracy theory of France gone wrong, quoting a phrase from Michel Rocard: “Always prefer the hypothesis of bullshit to that of conspiracy. Stupidity is common, conspiracy requires rare wit. »

His book reveals the succession of errors and improvisations in a context of strong Franco-Ivorian tensions. “In November 2004, we are almost two years after the Marcoussis agreements [des accords qui doivent conduire à des élections libres et transparentes en 2005 en Côte d’Ivoire]recalls Thomas Hofnung. The French see that these agreements have absolutely not worked. The rebels refuse to disarm and Operation “Unicorn” is stuck in a conflict that seems to be getting bogged down. »

“Seeing Gbagbo preparing to attack, it is possible that the French, disoriented and divided, decided to let him do it (…). When the [Forces armées nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire, Fanci] launch Operation “Dignity”, the French look elsewhere, and the UN Security Council does not meet, continues Thomas Hofnung. It is even possible that we helped Gbagbo, by giving him information such as the positions of the peacekeepers and the “Unicorn” forces. » Paris, which hoped to calm its relations with the Ivorian government, will ultimately have to manage the repatriation of 8,000 nationals in November 2004.

“Very lively” interview between Chirac and Gbagbo

A third journalist, Fanny Pigeaud, also published on August 11 on Mediapart a series of four articles devoted to the affair. Colonel de Revel, who served in Operation “Licorne”, thinks that “the bombing of Bouaké caused General Poncet a psychological shock and a feeling of betrayal”while the French soldiers had adopted an attitude on the ground « permissive » towards loyalist forces.

“General Poncet did not seem hostile to this “Dignity” operation, he explains, but basically said to the Fanci: “Be careful guys, don’t touch a single hair of the French forces.” Perhaps also that there were knee-jerk reactions in Paris – we know that the day before the offensive, the telephone conversation between Chirac and Gbagbo had been very lively, and even violent – ​​and that he missed a sufficiently detailed geostrategic reflection to prevent our reaction from leading to a general conflagration. »

Paris and Abidjan have cast a veil over what everyone's intentions were during these few days of embers. The question of the identity of the sponsor of the bombing of Bouaké and his motive, in particular, remains unresolved. In response, did France encourage the then chief of staff of the Ivorian army, General Mathias Doué, to lead a coup d'état? The officer who declared his desire to hunt six months later “by all means” Laurent Gbagbo of power will no longer be able to answer: he died in 2017.

However, there remain many witnesses. Quoted as such, Michel Barnier, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the events, explained during the trial in Paris that he was not aware of anything, not even of the diplomatic telegram informing him of the arrest of the Belarusian pilots at Lomé. Same ignorance on the part of Dominique de Villepin then inside or of Michel de Bonnecorse (since dead), at the head of the Africa cell of the Elysée. Michèle Alliot-Marie, for the defense, had stressed for her part that she had above all to manage the « chaos » events.

Laurent Gbagbo has always protested his innocence without ever convincing and has never taken measures for the benefit of those who were, as they claimed, killed “bare hands” defend his power. Alassane Ouattara, his successor, has no interest in reawakening this wound from the past, he who owes his accession to power in part to the French army and has shown great closeness with Paris since 2011. In Ivory Coast, no official ceremony marked the 20th anniversary of these few, forgettable days in November 2004.