The register imagined by Canada, and contained in Bill C-70 tabled on Monday, is inspired by that of Australia, but does not go as far as that of Great Britain. Only people who have an “arrangement” with a foreign state to influence the “Canadian political process” will be required to register. Here, “political process” is understood in the broad sense: it is a question of elections, the granting of government contracts, the adoption of laws. The attempt to influence may take the form of contact with a public office holder or public communication, particularly on social networks. The British register provides that for certain threatening countries, anyone working for them must register, regardless of the nature of their activities.
Another element to consider: there is no definition of what constitutes an “arrangement”. Will a written contract be required? A monetary exchange? Will a verbal agreement be enough and if so, how will its existence be proven? If there’s one thing the Hogue report confirms, it’s how insidious interference can be.
Take the example of Kenny Chiu, this conservative MP defeated in 2021 who claims to have been the victim of a Chinese disinformation campaign. What does Judge Hogue tell us about this episode? That it all started with an anonymous blog on the 105.9 Yes My Radio website, later taken over by Global Chinese Convergence Media. These two Chinese-language Canadian media outlets have “close ties to the government or government media outlets of China.”
Who was behind this blog? And how can we determine whether these media have an “arrangement” with Beijing? As the judge writes, it is “possible that China did not give a direct order on this subject” as it is “also possible that it was not necessary, the people wanting to help China often knowing what to do without waiting for any instructions whatsoever. In short, it is doubtful whether a register would have been useful in this case.
Fortunately, the future Intelligence Commissioner, who will administer this register, will have the power to conduct investigations. He will be able to force people to appear before him, to give testimony under oath and to produce documents. He will still have to be put on a track. This is where probably the most important piece of C-70 comes into play: a change to the Security of Information Act.
A radical change
Currently, it is prohibited to induce someone by threat to do anything that will increase a state’s ability to harm Canadian interests. However, there are plenty of cases where the harm to Canada’s interest is not immediately obvious. Let’s think of these students from Don Valley-North who would have been under pressure to support the liberal Han Dong in the 2019 nomination. If members of the diasporas complain so little about the pressures they suffered, it is because they have the impression that the police can do nothing about it. Ottawa remedies the situation by abandoning the reference to Canada’s interest. Simply lobbying on behalf of a foreign state becomes illegal.
The other important component of C-70 is to allow the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to exchange information with a wider range of stakeholders, including universities with foreign partnerships. But the bill does not provide anything to improve sharing with existing partners. However, Justice Hogue concluded that CSIS shared intelligence that was too general. “This reduces the likelihood that recipients will fully understand the situation and take appropriate action. […] We should consider, if possible and appropriate, that the agencies responsible for intelligence release more details.”
The commission has also uncovered a mind-blowing example.
In October 2019, eight days after the federal election, CSIS produced a report asserting that a Canadian citizen “with ties to the political community” potentially engaged in foreign interference that had an impact on the election. The problem? CSIS had not shared this crucial information with the task force that monitors election integrity — a group of which it is a part!
The president of the group loses his temper and asks if his verdict, to the effect that the election had been fair, was contradicted. What does CSIS do? He swallows his words, claiming to have perhaps “overestimated the repercussions of the actions committed”! Let’s admit that this raises the question of whether CSIS is hiding things or drawing certain conclusions too quickly.
Dilemmas
As the judge points out, foreign interference leads to “a paradoxical situation”: citizens are right to want to know what is happening, but sounding the alarm too quickly could “needlessly undermine public confidence in the respect for a system that remains fundamentally reliable” and thus play into the hands of foreign states seeking to undermine democracy.
Another dilemma: by leaving the media ecosystem to self-correct when false information circulates in an electoral context, this gives this false information time to influence minds. But what is the alternative? The judge does not appear convinced that “the public would accept that senior officials determine what information must be corrected.”
There will be no quick fix to foreign interference. The C-70 is a good first step. Given that it is almost impossible for it to be in place in time for the next election, with the government estimating that it will need a year to implement it, it would be wise not to rush its adoption. A question of analyzing it well and perfecting what can be done.
