Focusing on “the implications of continued friction along the Moroccan-Algerian border,” a CIA document dated October 18, 1963 addressed the issue of the Sand War that occurred between the two countries on October 8 of the same year. .
Declassified in 2004, the document indicates that clashes between Morocco and Algeria “will probably continue” and will thus develop “new zones of hostility” along the border. However, “it seems that the outbreak of open war is unlikely, in light of the limited capabilities of the two armies.”
“The Moroccan army is made up of 32,500 men, organized into eighteen infantry battalions, three cavalry and artillery battalions, one armored, one engineering, a light security group and two air squadrons, with units Support. It has 105 planes,” specifies the CIA.
Although the Algerian army has 60,000 troops, it may be able to expand into a diverse force of 200,000 soldiers. That said, “it remains at a disadvantage compared to the Moroccan side, in terms of organization, training and equipment, in addition to the lack of air reinforcement and its very limited surveillance capacity in the air”, in addition to “a serious shortage of transport,” underlines the same Source.
“If limited hostilities continue or develop into more serious clashes at other points in Hassi Beida and Tinjoub, where the current skirmishes are taking place, a diplomatic breakdown is likely to occur.”
CIA Document
“Even if the current crisis subsides, Morocco and Algeria will remain very suspicious of each other,” American intelligence further explains. Furthermore, they believe that the continuation of tensions with Algeria “would weaken the opposition in Morocco and strengthen the authority of King Hassan II”.
Also, Algeria’s difficulties with Rabat could give rise to “new hostilities” against Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene, exacerbated by mobilization and frictions “already existing between former members of the rebel army abroad and that inside, which would prevent the development of an effective and reliable Algerian army.
Algeria eyes Figuig in the aftermath of the Sand War
Another CIA document, dated October 21, 1963 and declassified in 2015, indicates that “Algeria is preparing to seize the Moroccan region of Figuig, in response to the loss of Hassi Beida and Tinjoub.” According to this Source, the military belligerences would not prevent “the diplomatic efforts which are continuing to achieve a cease-fire”.
Then Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika went to Rabat unexpectedly, “accompanied by his Ethiopian counterpart”, in “a surprising step which raised hopes of success of Hailé Selassie’s mediation” . Ghana also mobilized “envoys on the ground”. After calling for a ceasefire and a return to the previous status quo, the League of Arab States appointed a mediation committee.
The same document indicates that the day before, “the Moroccans arrested at least three Egyptian officers, most probably five, aboard an Algerian helicopter which was allegedly on a reconnaissance mission.” The arrest took place upon landing on national territory, “northwest of Colomb-Béchar”. “The Algerians admitted that there were five Egyptians and that the Moroccan planes had committed an airspace violation, to force the helicopter to land in Morocco.”
For its part, Morocco asserts that “the Egyptian forces were fighting alongside the Algerians, which the arrest of the officers corroborates.” The war between the two countries ended thanks to the mediation of the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) where an armistice agreement was signed on February 20, 1964, in the city of Bamako, the capital of Mali.
