Defense issues have remained the pillar of this good understanding: 90% of the weapons imported by Hanoi between 1995 and 2015 are Russian. In addition to being a valuable Source of military assistance, Moscow is also an increasingly important economic partner. Several Russian companies – such as Gazprom and Zarubezhneft – hold a considerable stake in Vietnam’s gas and oil sector. And business is working: Vietsovpetro, a Russian-Vietnamese joint venture created in 1982, generated annual revenue of $1.7 billion in 2021.
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Neutrality on the invasion of Ukraine
Vietnam, however, is careful not to show direct support for the Russian offensive in Ukraine, unlike Burma, which has re-exported Russian military equipment to the Ukrainian front to support the Kremlin soldiers. During the UN General Assembly held in March 2020, the Vietnamese authorities did not condemn the offensive, but paid lip service to the importance of respecting international law. The reasons for this neutrality? Avoid offending Hanoi’s main trading partners, Europe, the United States and Japan. Vietnam has therefore not undertaken any action likely to be perceived as a violation of Western sanctions.
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To protect its back, the country even made a donation of $500,000 to humanitarian organizations present in Ukraine during the first year of the conflict. After all, kyiv had supported North Vietnam militarily in its “War of Liberation of South Vietnam” (1955-1975), as a member of the Soviet Union. This balancing act, called by Vietnamese leaders “bamboo diplomacy”, allows Hanoi to intelligently take advantage of the opportunities born from competition between the different powers.
Concerns about China
This carefully maintained multidirectional diplomacy could, however, come to a halt with the strengthening of the strategic link between Moscow and Beijing (read previous page). Hanoi has a long-standing dispute with its imposing neighbor, which it accuses of violating its sovereignty in the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea.
But the Vietnamese leaders are aware of their military subordination to Moscow. Will Russia still be ready to support them in the defense of their territory, despite its own growing diplomatic dependence on China? Will it agree to withdraw its drilling platforms which are located in the maritime zone claimed by Beijing?
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Breaking ties with Moscow being ruled out, Vietnam is aware that it must develop its own defense industry and find other arms suppliers. The country has been purchasing arms from Israel, South Korea, France and Japan for several years. The Russo-Ukrainian war accelerated this policy of diversification. But freeing yourself from a major arms supplier is a process that turns out to be slow and expensive. Even if it strengthens its various current defense partnerships, Vietnam is likely to remain dependent on Russia for another decade or two, according to an analysis by the Singaporean Yusof Ishak Institute. “Bamboo diplomacy” still has a bright future ahead of it.
