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Why Kim Jong-un sent soldiers to Russia

The effect is immediate: with the sending of its soldiers to Russia, North Korea propels itself as an important piece on the great chessboard of the international community. Kim Jong-un recalls his presence there by appearing alongside Putin, after having experienced American economic sanctions, the failure of summits with Donald Trump [en 2018 et 2019]the arrival of a conservative government in Seoul, the isolation of North Korea on the diplomatic scene, etc.

For its own survival, the regime chose to create the conditions for a possible world war into which the great powers could be drawn. The United States and NATO will have to react sooner or later. And for South Korea, the war in Ukraine is no longer a “others’ war”.

“Some 3,000 soldiers from special units of the North Korean army have been sent to Russia, where a total of around 10,000 are expected until December,” Jo Tae-yong, the head of South Korea's intelligence services, said on October 23.

The importance of timing

Du Jin-ho, of the National Defense Research Center in Seoul, says foreign contingents can play several roles: “There are of course fighters, but also those who ensure security and reconstruction at the rear.” Before this shipment, a certain number of North Korean soldiers were already present on Russian soil, like these engineers who were fully familiar with the weapons that Pyongyang supplied to Russia, such as the KN-23 short-range missiles.

Various South Korean specialists on North Korea agree that the North Korean soldiers sent to Russia are not fighters immediately dispatched to the Ukrainian front. Winter is approaching and the fighting will instead continue with air strikes. What should attract attention above all is the timing that Pyongyang chose to launch this expedition – a few days before the American presidential election.

Since the start of the year, North Korea has defied the predictions of the government and experts in Seoul. They had, for example, predicted significant reforms to the North Korean Constitution during the Supreme People's Assembly on October 7 and 8, reforms intended to ratify the regime's desire to sever all ties with its northern neighbor. South.

Alliance against alliance

Nothing like that happened. Kim Jong-un preferred concrete actions, namely blowing up road and rail links and strengthening the barrier between the two countries. After accusing Seoul, on October 11, of having launched drones into the northern sky to drop leaflets, the authorities in Pyongyang were content to issue threats of reprisals in the event that such an act were repeated.

Instead of attacking the South, North Korea preferred to send soldiers to Russia. The opposition between Pyongyang on one side and the Seoul-Washington alliance on the other has thus widened with the involvement of Moscow. Hong Min, a researcher at the Reunification Research Center in Seoul, is categorical: “What North Korea wants from Russia in exchange for military aid is a strong defense alliance equivalent to that which unites South Korea and the United States in the field of defense. The latter will now have to deal not only with North Korea but also with Russia.”

Du Jin-ho clarifies the point:

“Despite its nuclear control, North Korea still faces American pressure. Kim Jong-un is taking short-term risks by separating himself from part of the elite of his army, to strengthen the security of his regime in the longer term.

Trump, Pyongyang's winning bet

It is difficult to see a simple pari in the choice of Pyongyang – since it was revealed a few days before the American presidential election. Russia and North Korea had every reason to want Donald Trump back. Because the Republican candidate pleaded, regarding the war in Ukraine, for prioritizing the end of hostilities – which implies the signing of an armistice without the territories occupied by Russia being returned to Ukraine.

Furthermore, the participation of the North Korean army in this war was for many considered a failure of the Joe Biden government. This is undoubtedly what explains why the other powers still remain cautious, with the underlying fear of being involved in a war that does not directly concern them and thereby accentuating the split within the international community. Only Ukraine and South Korea have clearly expressed themselves.

Seoul's hasty reaction

“We understand that the North Korean initiative worries kyiv, comments Yang Mu-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. But it is less understood that Seoul is raising the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine, while the United States and NATO are opting for caution while waiting for things to be clarified about the scale and objectives of the troops. North Koreans in Russia.” He adds:

“I don’t understand why our government wants to get involved in this war on its own initiative.”

Yang Mu-jin refers to the October 22 announcement by South Korea's emergency National Security Council to “measures [qui] will be taken in stages depending on the progress of military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang,” including the possibility of supplying lethal weapons to kyiv.

The question arises as to the relevance and effectiveness of Seoul's reactions. The direct link between North Korean action and the supply of weapons to the Ukrainians is not obvious. Such a move would make Russia an enemy of South Korea; but on the other hand, we do not know by what mechanism this would slow down North Korea.

Yoon Suk-yeol and the “flag effect”

Furthermore, it would be a de facto participation in the war. It is not certain that the government can take such a measure in the absence of the approval of the National Assembly, not to mention the many questions it raises, for example about the budget or the risk of weakening the national security. Lee Jun-han, professor at Incheon University, talks about a “flag effect” :

“Faced with an external threat, solidarity is necessarily created around the leader.”

“South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his government need to show firmness towards North Korea to consolidate their electorate,” explains the academic. It is also the opportunity, he adds, to “silence critics in a tense context due to the numerous affairs involving the first lady, Kim Keon-hee, as well as the president's disagreements with the party from which he comes, and in particular with its leader”.

Since coming to power in 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol has always suggested that it is possible to control North Korea by force. It is clear today that not only did he not succeed, but above all, this policy even pushed North Korea to choose its side, so that the inter-Korean question is currently experiencing an international extension never before possible. considered.

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