Ln December 31, 2022, around a hundred Russian soldiers were killed near Donetsk by a missile strike. They had been spotted thanks to the broadcast of their mobile phones gathered in the same place. On December 25, 38 people lost their lives in the crash in Kazakhstan of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190, probably hit a few hours earlier by a Russian anti-aircraft missile above Grozny. According to the Flight Radar site, which tracks air traffic in real time, the plane had previously been subject to GPS interference. On January 5, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise limited counterattack in the Russian Kursk oblast, massively jamming the signal of enemy FPV (First Person View) drones.
These three examples illustrate the massive electronic warfare that Ukraine and Russia have been engaged in for almost three years in a so-called “high intensity” conflict. Electronic warfare allows “to detect, interpret, control or disrupt signals from the electromagnetic spectrum – in particular radar, radio or infrared transmissions – in order to protect military assets against any potential threat”, according to the definition of the Thalès company, French specialist in the field. In 1905, Russia was the first to do so. While at war against Japan, the Russian fleet realized that by increasing the frequency of its radios, it was preventing enemy ships from communicating with each other.
Russian electronic warfare
Disrupt, intercept or protect communications, render drones inoperable, hide radio broadcasts from a command post… In Ukraine, the two camps compete in audacity and ingenuity in a race between the sword (the attack) and the shield (defense) that never stops. In a study entitled “Ukraine and the problem of restoring maneuver in contemporary warfare”, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) sees in the “rapid and dynamic evolution of measures and countermeasures of electronic warfare” one of the main characteristics of future wars.
“Since 2008, Russia has invested enormously in electronic warfare, by creating a full-fledged headquarters and bringing together small, scattered units to make five brigades, not counting the navy and air force units,” recalls a French officer specializing in electronic warfare. Western armies have abandoned electronic attacks since the end of the Cold War to invest in information-enhanced combat and the speed of communication between units facing technologically weaker enemies or terrorist groups. The Russian army is not to be outdone and massively resorted to electronic warfare in 2014 during the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbass. Ukrainian soldiers then received messages ordering them to stop the fighting. Engaged in Syria, it also manages to mask the movements of its troops.
Battlefield Transparency
But in 2022, Russian superiority in the field is less striking against Ukraine, which has undoubtedly learned from its mistakes. “The Ukrainians have adapted very well by bringing out old landline telephones and integrating civil engineers,” notes the French officer. On the battlefield, developments occur quickly on one side or the other, dictated by urgency. Certain Russian Orlan-10 drones, normally dedicated to artillery targeting, fly equipped with jammers to counter other drones. Up to 10,000 drones are used on the front lines every day.
“Ubiquitous reconnaissance drones have made the battlefield almost transparent, except when the adversary was able to cover it with effective defensive electronic warfare,” points out the ISW. So that its own drones can strike enemy targets, each side must stop or reduce its jamming for a time, leaving an “open door” for its opponent, who can take advantage of it. With a stabilized front, electronic warfare has regained importance, with in certain places electronic jammers placed every 10 kilometers.
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During the Ukrainian counter-offensive of June 2023, Russian forces used GPS jamming extensively, degrading “Ukraine’s ability to coordinate front-line forces, including combat vehicles”, and “to fully utilize precision munitions supplied by the West which rely on GPS”, underlines the study. However, Ukraine managed to hide its intentions by surprise attack, in August 2024, on part of the Russian oblast of Kursk, undermining the impression of total transparency of the battlefield.
“Surprise is still possible. The more sensors there are, the more sensors there are to deceive as well,” judges the officer specializing in electronic warfare. In recent months, drones controlled by fiber optic cables have also appeared. This avoids jamming the drone, but reduces its range, limited to the length of the cable, and above all makes its operator more vulnerable. A new adaptation to the electronic warfare raging in the airwaves.
