Interview
December 4, 2024
The civil war in Syria, born from Arab protest movements in 2011 and having caused more than 500,000 deaths, had gradually frozen from 2017, the front line evolving only at the margins between the different groups of opposition and the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. The status quo, however, has exploded since November 27, the start of the offensive by rebels hitherto entrenched in Idlib on Aleppo, controlled by the loyalists. The weakening of the Damascus regime is reshuffling the cards in the regional game, due to the involvement of foreign powers in the Syrian theater. Who are the rebels? What is their objective? What is the role of foreign powers in the resumption of the conflict? How does it impact the balance of power in the Middle East? The analysis of Didier Billion, deputy director of IRIS and specialist in the Middle East.
The opposition forces to the Bashar Al-Asad regime led by the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, until now entrenched in Idlib, have just successfully launched an offensive on Aleppo, Syria's second city, and are now moving towards the South. What are the rebels' project and ideology? In what context is this offensive taking place?
It seems necessary to contextualize this offensive by focusing on the group which mainly leads it, HTS. Its main leader, Mohamed Al-Julani, is of Syrian origin. He took part in the jihadist war in Iraq after the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003. After a stay in prison, he returned to Syria in 2011 and participated in the founding of the Al-Front. Nusra, Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. Quite quickly, a dispute arose with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, leader of Daesh in Iraq. He wanted to ensure leadership of the entire Iraqi-Syrian jihadist field, which, obviously, was not accepted by Al-Julani. Their rupture therefore did not occur for religious or ideological reasons, but more prosaically for the distribution of political, military and financial responsibilities of the fighting groups. The leadership of Al-Qaeda at the time decided in favor of Al-Julani, who therefore imposed himself on the field of Syrian jihadists. A major turning point then occurred in 2016, Al-Julani breaking away from Al-Qaeda and abandoning the name of the Al-Nusra Front to create HTS. Was this the result of a change in political software or a tactical move? Difficult to estimate, but it is clear that this helped Al-Julani to obtain the support of several actors, notably Turkey, in the siege of Aleppo which he was already leading at that time. Despite this official break with Al-Qaeda, it should be remembered that some of the groups currently allied with HTS are, for their part, still linked to Al-Qaeda, for example the Turkestan Islamic Party.
Coming back to current events, it seems important to qualify the term “jihadists”, often used to describe the members of HTS. We are not here in the context of a jihad in the style of Al-Qaeda or Daesh in their time, that is to say an international jihad against the “Franks and the Crusaders”. HTS is in fact a Syrian organization, whose political agenda is specifically Syrian, which does not contradict the fact that its ideology is radically Islamist. HTS is made up of supporters of radical political Islam who want not only to strengthen their influence over the province of Idlib – which they have dominated for several years – but also to conquer as much ground as possible to impose themselves on the rest of the territory. Will they manage to conquer all of Syria? This is difficult to predict at this stage. Their success in Aleppo is indisputable, to see if other cities will fall in the days or weeks to come. As for their long-term project, it aims to weaken the central power of Damascus as much as possible in order to establish Sharia law as well as the precepts of radical Islamists.
Faced with this direct opposition between the forces of the Damascus regime and HTS, what is the position of the other armed groups present in Syria, in particular the “Syrian National Army” (ANS) supported by Turkey and the “Syrian Democratic Forces” led by the Kurds of the YPG?
If HTS is indeed the spearhead of this multifaceted offensive, there is another important component to take into account, the “Syrian National Army”. This is more of a conglomerate of several organizations, sometimes very small groups, than a real army, which is in reality the case of most of the organizations taking part in the Syrian conflict, making its reading so complex. As such, each small group has its market share, monopolizes international aid and tries to establish strongholds that are often in competition with each other. Despite their diversity, the ten factions making up the ANS have one thing in common: military and financial support from Turkey. Having taken part in the fighting in the northern and north-eastern part of Aleppo, they can be considered as “co-winners”, with HTS, of the battle – which was of very low intensity – which opposed them to Bashar's forces. Al-Assad for control of the city. The actions of the ANS being inseparable from Turkey's projects, we can consider the latter to be a large beneficiary of the current operations.
This is not the case, however, for the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), a completely different group, including a few Arab tribes, but mainly controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian franchise of the Party. of Kurdistan Workers (PKK), and main target of Turkey and the ANS in the Syrian conflict. The FDS are therefore extremely worried about the course the fighting is currently taking, because they risk cutting off the supply routes between the different pockets they control in the north of the country, and strengthening the pro-Turkish ANS.
To what extent is this thaw in the Syrian civil war capable of upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East?
There has been little talk about it in recent days, but the evolution of the situation in Syria can indeed potentially modify part of the political, even military, balance of power in the Middle East, since it breaks the the state in which which existed in the country since 2017-2018. This the state in which materialized through the Astana tripartite agreement, which brought together Iran and Russia, supporters of Bashar Al-Assad, and Turkey, more closely linked to the rebels. The three countries had “divided the tasks”, the first two cooperating and ensuring the protection of Damascus while Turkey ensured the management of Idlib, seat of the rebels. This does not of course mean that HTS is under Turkey's orders. This is an indirect relationship, based on local compromises, as often exists in countries with failed states such as Syria almost currently. Turkey, Iran and Russia agreed that the front line could not change without negotiations and compromise, a resolution that the offensive of HTS and its allies swept away in recent days, opening a new sequence of conflict.
A second parameter allowing us to understand the evolution of the balance of power in the region is the attempt, for around two years, at normalization between Ankara and Damascus. This is part of a more general geopolitical plan promoted by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of reconciliation with a number of Arab states with which he had fallen out: United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and more recently Egypt. Despite Russia's support for this prospect of normalization between Ankara and Damascus, Bashar Al-Assad, blinded by the hubris of his apparent victory, had until then constantly opposed it, first demanding the withdrawal of the occupying Turkish troops. several enclaves in northern Syria as part of their fights against the FDS, which Turkey completely refuses. The rebel offensive could radically change this situation. The disbandment of Damascus' forces, fleeing Aleppo without a fight, could indeed push Bashar Al-Asad to reconsider his position, particularly under pressure from Russia, which one can imagine would condition its support for Bashar Al-Assad on the condition that he finally accepts normalization between Damascus and Ankara. Turkey is therefore emerging from this crisis in a position of strength for the moment, which allows it to progress in the implementation of its two main concerns in Syria: establishment of a buffer zone all along the Turkish-Syrian border allowing controlling the FDS close to the PKK, and sending back the more than 3 million Syrian refugees living on its soil, whose presence is less and less accepted in Türkiye.
The weakening of Bashar Al-Assad in the Syrian theater is also viewed favorably by Israel. The supply of Lebanese Hezbollah by Iran, which Tel Aviv wishes to stop, in fact passes through Syria, and Damascus is one of Iran's main points of support in the region. However, the Jewish state had long seemed to prefer the maintenance of Bashar Al-Assad to the coming to power of Islamist and jihadist groups on its border. Its strategy today seems to have changed, aiming to push its pawns to the maximum to weaken Iran, its obsession, even if it means taking the risk of Islamist groups seizing Damascus.
