when recreating the Spanish flu virus becomes possible

The idea that one could easily order the synthetic DNA needed to recreate the 1918 Spanish flu virus may seem out of reach. However, an experiment carried out by an MIT laboratory revealed that this task can be done without much difficulty, calling into question the security measures in place. Even with checks performed by providers for potentially harmful footage, the risks of abuse remain, highlighting the need for increased vigilance.

This experience shows that the considerable benefits of biotechnology can in return present significant vulnerabilities to abuse. A pandemic caused by a virus made from synthetic DNA, or even a minor incident of bioterrorism, would not only cause a public health crisis, but also impose crippling restrictions on scientific research.

Accessibility of genomic sequences: a double-edged sword

Genomic sequences of pandemic viruses and detailed protocols for making infectious samples from synthetic DNA are now freely available online, making systematic monitoring of all synthetic DNA orders essential.

Leaders in gene synthesis are aware of the safety risks and potential liabilities. Since 2009, supplier members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) have voluntarily screened orders, but these efforts prove insufficient if the majority of non-members do not screen theirs. Sequence screening can, however, be easily circumvented.

To test the effectiveness of current practices, two MIT doctoral students conducted a red-teaming experiment supervised by the FBI. They used simple evasion strategies to disguise orders for DNA fragments that could be used to replicate the 1918 influenza virus.

The approach of Rey Edison and Shay Toner, lead authors of the study, was to slightly modify the genetic sequences ordered in order to circumvent the suppliers’ screening algorithms. By doing so, they were able to place orders without being detected. “ Our results demonstrate that almost all DNA synthesis screening practices employed in October 2023 failed to reject thinly disguised drives that could be assembled to produce viable selective agents, including a pandemic virus », Write the researchers in their document.

Their results highlighted a troubling reality: although screening mechanisms exist, they are not infallible. The researchers pointed out that the current system relies too heavily on supplier good faith and screening technologies that can be easily thwarted with relatively basic biotechnology knowledge. Edison and Toner are therefore calling for an overhaul of security protocols, suggesting the integration of advanced methods to strengthen the detection and prevention of suspicious orders. This experience highlights the urgency of developing more robust solutions to protect society against the threats posed by synthetic biotechnology.

Towards reinforced regulation?

To protect the bioeconomy, it is essential that businesses continue to adhere to robust security protocols, such as those offered by the IGSC, which include customer and footage screening. Although these efforts are already in place, they are not yet harmonized globally to ensure that all industry players apply uniform biosafety standards.

Additionally, with the rise of synthetic biology technologies, we find ourselves at a critical crossroads where innovation and security must coexist. The possibility of recreating deadly viruses like the 1918 Spanish flu is chilling. It is not just a question of science, but of collective responsibility. The future of biotechnology will therefore depend on our ability to navigate carefully between potential and peril.