Russia's shadow looms over Eastern Europe. Since the end of November, Georgia has been shaken by a series of demonstrations, violently repressed by the police. At the origin of popular anger: the postponement of discussions on the country's integration into the EU, decided by Georgian Dream, the party in power accused of pro-Russian authoritarian drift. The authorities expect further unrest on Saturday, December 14, when deputies must choose the successor to the current president, Salomé Zourabichvili, a pro-European who has broken with the government.
Georgian Dream was reappointed at the head of the country at the end of October, amid accusations of fraud. Despite the irregularities noted by European observers, the vote was not canceled, unlike the one held in Romania at the end of November. The first round of the presidential election, which saw Calin Georgescu triumph to everyone's surprise, was rendered obsolete, while the candidate for pro-Kremlin positions is suspected of having benefited from a manipulation operation on the social network TikTok. In Moldova too, Moscow invited itself into the campaign via a vote buying system, controlled from Russia, against pro-European president Maia Sandu, narrowly re-elected against her rival acquired in Moscow.
But beyond these obvious irregularities, there is an electorate seduced by these parties and personalities displaying pro-Kremlin positions. In Austria, the far right, opposed to sanctions against Russia, for example won the September legislative elections for the first time since 1945, without notable fraud. As for Romania, supporters of Calin Georgescu stepped up to the plate after the cancellation of the presidential election.
In these countries, “we are witnessing a standoff between the pro-West and Putin’s Russia”estimates Lukas Macek, who heads the Greater Europe center at the Jacques-Delors Institute. Nevertheless, “when we describe candidates as ‘pro-Russian’, we have to put in quotation marks”nuance David Teurtrie, lecturer at the Catholic Institute of Vendée and director of the French Brics Observatory. “In countries where the government is described as pro-European, there may be alternative candidates who, to stand out, will hold a populist discourse on all areas, including Russia”.
In Romania, for example, Calin Georgescu refers to Vladimir Putin as “a man who loves his country”admires the ties between Russia and Hungary and does not hide his hostility to the European Union. Like the Russian president, this far-right independent candidate likes to portray himself as the master of the Kremlin, on horseback, on an athletics track or on a tatami mat, in his videos on TikTok. But he also presents himself as the candidate “the oppressed and the humiliated”thus galvanizing “an anti-elite, anti-establishment electorate, mobilized against the winners of the changes of the last thirty years”analysis by Lukas Macek.
Because these elections were held in a context of generalized inflation within the European Union, “but which affects more the populations of Central European countries, whose standard of living is significantly lower than the European average”points out David Teurtrie. In Romania, it reached 5% over one year in October, the highest rate of the Twenty-Seven, according to Eurostat data. In Austria, inflation was still at 4.1% in March, and only fell below the EU average in September, at the time of the elections. In Moldova and Georgia, these are also “internal priorities, such as the cost of living, which emerge from surveys on voting motivations”recalls the specialist.
“There is an overinterpretation of the place given to foreign policy in the vote.”
David Teurtriespecialist in Russian geopolitics
Still, a rapprochement with Russia could appeal to less well-off populations. “The conflict has a strong impact on these countries, perhaps even more than on Europe in general, because they are more dependent on Russian gas and oil supplies”underlines David Teurtrie. Herbert Kickl, the head of the far-right party that won the legislative elections in Austria, for example, campaigned on stopping aid provided to Ukraine and his opposition to European sanctions imposed on Russia. “Russia is no longer the leading country for exports of these states, but remains an important market. Sanctions have reduced their trade relations in most cases”adds David Teurtrie.
For the electorate of these countries, Hungary can serve as an attractive example. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has not cut ties with Vladimir Putin, unlike other EU leaders. And despite the embargo voted by the Twenty-Seven, his country continues to obtain Russian oil. “The case of Hungary shows that it is possible to be both a member of the EU and halfway between Brussels and Moscow”underlines David Teurtrie, even if this position is a source of strong tensions between Budapest and its European partners.
In Moldova and Georgia, the prospect of having to break with Russia in the event of joining the EU may have cooled part of the electorate, according to Laure Delcour, lecturer at Sorbonne-Nouvelle University. “Moscow is not demanding any reform and is opening its market to countries that are politically close to it, where the EU is demanding changes, and therefore costs”before enjoying the economic benefits of integration, she explains. During a referendum on the inclusion in the Constitution of the objective of Moldova's entry into the EU, parallel to the presidential election, the “yes” only narrowly won.
According to observers, there is also real support among the population for the pro-Russian discourse, in the former Soviet republics of Moldova and Georgia, but also beyond. “States occupied by the Red Army at the end of the Second World War [comme la Roumanie] include citizens who have memories – idealized or real – of Soviet hegemony.exposed the Robert Schuman Institute in June before elections in Bulgaria, another country where Russia's sympathizers have strengthened themselves at the polls.
In Slovakia, which saw Kremlin-friendly Prime Minister Robert Fico triumph in 2023, then his ally Peter Pellegrini in the presidential election in April, “there is a Slavophil tradition, which regards Russia as a sister nation”also says Lukas Macek. “We often hear in Slovakia that the war in Ukraine is a tragedy, because it is Slavs killing Slavs: instead of creating a common bloc, they are divided because of powers adding fuel to the fire, that is to say the Westerners.”
Part of the electorate in these countries is also sensitive “ultraconservative discourse and the recovery of Christian values” by these pro-Russian parties and candidates, says Lukas Macek. On the Tbilisi side, the ruling Georgian Dream party adopted a law restricting the rights of LGBT+ people in October. He can count on the support of the Orthodox Church, which “holds a very open homophobic discourse, used to mobilize a part of the population, with the idea that Westerners want to lead them down the path to 'decadence'”supports the specialist. In front, “it is Russia which presents itself as a cultural rampart”concludes Laure Delcour.
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