In response to the agreement given to the Ukrainians by the United States to use ATACMS missiles even on Russian territory, the Kremlin once again brandished the nuclear threat. And evolves its doctrine. The opportunity to ask Yannick Pincé, doctor in contemporary history, associate researcher at Ciens (Interdisciplinary Center on Strategic Issues), who defended a thesis on the French nuclear “consensus”, on which pillars the French doctrine rests.
Should we be worried about the evolution of Russian doctrine?
This is a message aimed especially at Westerners, so that we show restraint. Russian doctrine now speaks of an expansion of the use of nuclear power, referring in particular to massive air attacks in the form of missiles aimed at Russia. This is an evolution but it remains vague, just as the previous formulation already was, which spoke of an “existential threat” against the Russian state. You can put whatever you want in it. This is the characteristic of a doctrine: it must remain sufficiently vague, and you must never give a clear red line, because if you tell your adversary what your limit is, it is an invitation for him to advances to this limit…
You say that the characteristic of a doctrine is that it must remain vague, is this also the case in France?
Yes. French doctrine also mentions “vital interests”, and these are not defined. This is what creates the strategic vagueness, that is to say that it remains at the free discretion of the President of the Republic. This term of vagueness has always been used in French doctrine, formulated in the White Papers, or via the speeches of presidents. Our current doctrine is based on Emmanuel Macron's speech at the War School in February 2020.
Has this doctrine evolved much?
It has evolved since the end of the Cold War. We abandoned tactical nuclear power, but we retained the idea of a final warning shot. Emmanuel Macron spoke precisely of “a unique and non-renewable warning” [en cas de menace]which he does not characterize. It would be a single shot, delivered either by Rafale or by an SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile submarine), knowing that the number of nuclear warheads in the SSBN's M51 missiles can be modulated. There are usually ten nuclear warheads in each of the sixteen missiles, but there is probably one with only one nuclear warhead, dedicated to this final warning shot.
On which target would this shot be carried out?
This could be at sea, in the desert, or even an isolated military target to send a stronger message. The doctrine also evokes centers of power. But no cities. We asked ourselves at one point the question of firing into the atmosphere to trigger an electromagnetic pulse, but this was a priori abandoned.
How powerful are these nuclear warheads?
Officially we do not know the power of nuclear weapons, but we have estimates. The ASMPA strategic missiles carried by the Rafale would carry thermonuclear warheads of 300 kilotons (the equivalent of 300,000 tons of TNT), and each M51 warhead would be around 100 kilotons, therefore knowing that there are ten per missile. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was a power of 15 kilotons. This is considerable, and we should therefore not neglect France's 290 nuclear weapons.
However, we sometimes wonder about the real credibility of France?
After the end of nuclear tests in 1995, France began a process of nuclear disarmament, and we withdrew one of our three components, removing our missiles from the Albion plateau [il a accueilli de 1971 à 1996 la base de lancement des missiles nucléaires sol-sol.] We also stopped the manufacture of fissile material, and reduced our warheads, from 500 to 290. What the United States and Russia also did, knowing that this had risen to more than 30,000 nuclear warheads at one point. (compared to around 6,000 today). That said, we still kept two components (oceanic and air), which is more credible than what the British have, who only have the oceanic component. The four SSBNs are based at Ile-Longue [dans la rade de Brest]and the nuclear warheads are stored nearby on the Crozon peninsula. The Strategic Air Forces operate primarily from three nuclear-focused air bases [à Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne) où est positionné l’escadron de chasse, Istres (Bouches-du-Rhône) et Avord (Cher)]. French deterrence is now based on the principle of strict sufficiency, that is to say that we refrain from holding more nuclear weapons than necessary, based on the principle that there is no point in being able to destroy his opponent several times…
On the other hand, it is important to have the capacity to saturate airspace, to be certain that at least one of these weapons will be able to penetrate enemy defenses?
Anti-missile defenses are not that powerful, and a few would necessarily get through, knowing that our missiles are becoming more and more capable. This is why it is estimated that this stock of 290 nuclear weapons is sufficient. This posture is also a way of positioning itself as a nation that does not see its nuclear weapon as aggressive, but defensive.
Is this posture still adapted to the international context?
The problem that we can point out is that we have above all very powerful nuclear weapons, when the Russians have in their arsenal tactical nuclear weapons, with a power of a few kilotons, which can be launched at short distances. For example, they have installed some in Belarus. It can be a credibility problem to threaten to retaliate against tactical weapon fire, with a 300 kiloton weapon. The usefulness of having a large arsenal is to present to the adversary a whole diversity of graduated responses. Of course, the objective of a nuclear arsenal is to prevent the adversary from firing, but in France we refrain from thinking about the failure of deterrence. Conversely, the defenders of this position argue that providing intermediate bars makes nuclear power less frightening, and makes war possible.
What is the range of these missiles?
For SSBN missiles, we are in the tens of thousands of kilometers. But the SSBN, when it goes on patrol at sea, is diluted in the ocean in areas which allow it to be able to fire and hit any possible competitor.
Our file on the war in Ukraine
Concretely, what would happen in France if tomorrow a nuclear weapon targeted a country in the European Union?
If a nuclear weapon explodes, we enter a new world. Questions of international law would be completely turned upside down. That said, we have commitments with our allies, such as Article 5 of NATO which mentions that if one of our allies is attacked – nuclear weapon or not – this is considered an aggression against all, even if in reality this article remains very cautious about the answer to give. Article 42-7 of the European Union is more binding, it strictly obliges us to defend our allies. But not necessarily via a nuclear response. However, if Russia attacks a Baltic country, it attacks an ally of a nuclear power, so that enters into the calculation. In the end, it is a decision that would fall to the President of the Republic in any case.
Is he the one who presses the button?
There's probably no button, but yes it's the final decision maker. In the context of a single shot, there would first be a meeting of a defense council, where the engagement order would be taken and verified by its chief of staff. Then, a network of antennas located in the center of France makes it possible to reach the SNLE to deliver the message, and if this network were destroyed, there is a system of last resort, in the form of a balloon, itself equipped with antennas, which would be released to transmit.
Would a European nuclear defense make sense?
We would enter into very complicated mechanics. We cannot imagine a decision that would be taken by 27. However, French nuclear deterrence has always had a European vocation.
We feel that France has also had a desire to communicate for several months about its deterrence?
Communication has always existed in terms of deterrence, it is necessary to reveal part of our intentions. There are sometimes instructions to exit planes when a satellite from a powerful competitor passes over our territory.
What pushed de Gaulle to give France nuclear weapons?
We must not limit the choice of nuclear weapons for France to de Gaulle. The Fourth Republic quietly developed a nuclear program, under Mendès France in 1954, then Guy Mollet in 1956. But it is true that the first nuclear test took place under de Gaulle in 1960, and it was he who accelerated this program , because he is convinced that American protection will disappear. In a way, Donald Trump's recent speeches prove him right, sixty years later…
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