Israel pulls itself together, the Iranian axis collapses

One hundred hostages are still held in Gaza. Tens of thousands of Israelis are just beginning to hope for a return to stability in the north of the country. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis still have the capacity to launch rockets and drones. Soldiers continue to fall on the front lines in Gaza and southern Lebanon.

But 14 months after the Hamas surge, the worst day in Israel’s modern history, the Iranian “axis of resistance” is collapsing, while Israel appears to be beginning a recovery.

Despite the resounding failure to anticipate and prevent the pogrom perpetrated by the [groupe terroriste palestinien du] Hamas and despite a slow and prolonged military campaign in Gaza, Israeli ground and air intelligence forces have, over the past three months, dealt a devastating blow to [groupe terroriste chiite libanais du] Hezbollah, an army far more formidable than Hamas, operating beyond the northern border. This had the effect of weakening the regime of Bashar El-Assad in Syria and making it more vulnerable to overthrow by jihadist forces.

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Such a turning point would have been impossible if Netanyahu had opted for a halt to the war in Gaza in order to negotiate a deal on the release of the hostages. It could even have intervened earlier if the Gaza campaign had been more expeditious, allowing the IDF to quickly concentrate its efforts to neutralize Hezbollah.

Extremely suspicious of the assurances of the new Syrian jihadist leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who claims that Syria is “exhausted” by the war, and has no intention of opening new fronts, Israel reacted to the lightning takeover of power by Islamist rebels in Damascus through an equally devastating strategic counter-offensive. He destroyed not the Syrian army of Bashar El-Assad – whose troops had already dispersed – but the military infrastructure and weapons stocks of the Syrian regime of Bashar El-Assad.

The very name Al-Jolani recalls its roots in the Golan Heights. As for his group’s name, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, it translates to “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant” — a region that historically encompasses Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and, yes, present-day Israel. Wanted for terrorism by the United States since 2017, he is the subject of a $10 million reward for information leading to his capture.

Last Sunday, the same day he celebrated his victory in a speech at the Umayyad mosque in Damascus, a group of unidentified rebels, gathered in another mosque in the Syrian capital, proclaimed their intention to eventually lead , towards the Israeli capital: “This is the land of Islam, this is Damascus, the Muslim bastion. From here to Jerusalem. We will go to Jerusalem. Patience, people of Gaza, patience,” one of them said. His words were approved by the armed men surrounding him, chanting “Allahu akbar!” » [« Dieu est le plus grand » en arabe].

The distrust of the Israelis and the measures taken to prevent the worst scenarios are therefore required. If only Israel had done the same before October 7.

Syria has historically posed a major threat to Israel: a formidable and deadly enemy during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and a potential nuclear power until Israel destroyed its nuclear reactor, built with aid. of North Korea in 2007. Until last week, the country was home to the largest concentration of air defense systems in the world, according to former Israeli army chief Ido Nehoshtan.

Syria also had extensive weapons networks, chemical weapons infrastructure, and significant weapons production facilities.

The Israeli Air Force is said to have eliminated 80% of Syria’s military capacity, ensuring Israel’s air supremacy along the strategic corridor coveted by the ayatollahs – from the Mediterranean to Iraq and Iran, in passing through Lebanon and Syria.

By necessity, Israel also took control of the buffer zone on the Syrian border, including in particular the Syrian slope of the strategic Mount Hermon. Although the Iranian-backed Assad posed a significant potential threat, it was not immediate, and the border had until then been stable.

This is no longer the case today, and Israel has therefore reacted promptly to ensure the protection of its citizens.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the measure temporary, and, in theory, it is. However, it is difficult to predict when and how Israel will judge that a withdrawal can be carried out without risk.

Israel is also watching with concern the evolving risks of violent insurgency in Jordan, its neighbor with which it shares its longest border and which constitutes a crucial bulwark against Iran. Jordan, ruled by an unpopular monarchy that constantly criticizes Israel, nevertheless remains a key strategic partner in bilateral security coordination. Although the leaders of the two countries have a tense relationship marked by distrust and personal hostility, it remains essential for both nations to work to improve their strategic relations.

However, in a region where almost any scenario is possible and where dramatic and unexpected events occur every week, the major strategic concern remains, unsurprisingly, Iran.

The two main proxies of the Islamic Republic in their attempt to eliminate Israel have been considerably weakened. Bashar Al-Assad’s regime was quickly dismantled and its own vulnerabilities were exposed and amplified by the relative failure of its two strikes on Israel, as well as by the power of the Israeli response – a response that, despite its impact, remained relatively limited.

The fear is that the ayatollahs, out of options, will conclude that Assad in Syria, like Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq before him, was vulnerable because he did not have access to nuclear weapons. This could encourage them to further accelerate their nuclear weapons program. The issue is already openly debated, and uranium enrichment is intensifying. The regime already has powerful long-range missile capabilities, and US intelligence and the UN nuclear watchdog are deeply concerned about their activities.

It is to be hoped that the American and Israeli intelligence services have all the necessary information on the progress of the Iranian regime’s militarization program and the urgency of acting to thwart it.

Furthermore, although Netanyahu’s legal tactics have contributed to unduly extending the length of his corruption trial, and despite the fact that he regularly devotes much of his time to ceremonial and self-promotional activities, he is clearly problematic for Israel that its prime minister testifies three days a week in court, not to mention the many additional hours he spends preparing his defense.

A less restrictive judicial timetable would seem more appropriate, especially in a context where Israeli law allowed him to remain in office after his indictment, where judicial authorities reached an agreement authorizing him to continue to exercise his responsibilities even while testifying, and where Israel is going through an exceptionally critical and decisive period.