Israel’s role in Syria’s civil war

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The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, has rapidly evolved into a complex conflict involving local, regional and international actors. Israel, although not having played a direct role in the beginnings of the Syrian uprising, has gradually become involved in the conflict to protect its strategic and security interests. Its approach, discreet but resolute, was characterized by targeted airstrikes, pragmatic alliances with certain rebel groups and constant monitoring of developments on the ground. This role, largely oriented towards deterrence, reflects Israeli concerns over the growing power of Iran and Hezbollah in the region.

Israel’s involvement since 2011: security objectives and strategies

From the first years of the conflict, Israel sought to maintain a defensive posture while intervening in a targeted manner to achieve specific objectives. Several strategic priorities guided its involvement:

1. Securing the Golan Heights
   The Golan Heights, annexed by Israel in 1981, is an area of ​​crucial strategic importance. This mountainous region offers an ideal defensive position and constitutes a natural barrier against enemy incursions. As early as 2013, Israel increased its military presence on the border, establishing an advanced surveillance network to detect potential threats from pro-regime forces or Iranian militias operating nearby.
2. Weakening the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria axis
   The strategic alliance between Tehran, Damascus and Hezbollah is perceived by Israel as an existential threat. Damascus plays a key role as a transit point for the transfer of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. These weapons, including precision missiles, increase Hezbollah’s deterrence capacity against Israel. Beginning in 2013, Israel carried out repeated airstrikes against arms convoys and infrastructure linked to Hezbollah. These operations were considered tactical successes, but they did not completely halt the flow of weapons.
3. Preventing the establishment of Iranian bases in Syria
   Iran’s growing presence in Syria, through its Revolutionary Guards and affiliated militias, has heightened Israeli concerns. Israel fears that Iran could establish permanent bases near its borders, which would complicate its strategic position. In response, Israel targeted Iranian military infrastructure, weapons depots and command centers in Damascus and southern Syria.
4. Reduce the capabilities of the Syrian regime
   Although Bashar al-Assad’s regime is busy with its war against rebels, Israel views the Syrian army as a potential threat. Israeli strikes against Syrian military infrastructure aimed to limit Damascus’ ability to respond while sending a clear message: any support for anti-Israeli activities will be severely punished.

Tactical alliances with rebel groups

Between 2014 and 2018, Israel established pragmatic relations with some rebel groups operating in southern Syria, particularly near the Golan. These alliances, although limited, served several strategic objectives:

1. Medical and humanitarian support
   Israel has provided medical assistance to hundreds of wounded rebels, treating them in field hospitals near the border. Although presented as a humanitarian effort, this support also strengthened Israeli influence in the region.
2. Creating a buffer zone
   By supporting these groups, Israel sought to establish a buffer zone against pro-regime and pro-Iranian forces. These rebels served as a shield, protecting Israel’s borders against possible incursions.
3. Collection of information
   Interactions with these groups allowed Israel to obtain crucial information on the movements of the Syrian army, Hezbollah and Iranian militias. This intelligence was often used to plan specific strikes.

Intensification of Israeli strikes

Since 2015, Israel has carried out several hundred airstrikes in Syria, mainly targeting Iranian and Hezbollah military infrastructure. These strikes, often unclaimed, targeted:

1. Weapons convoys
   Israel has regularly struck convoys carrying precision missiles intended for Hezbollah. These strikes disrupted, but not completely stopped, the flow of weapons into Lebanon.
2. Iranian military bases
   Facilities built by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, often located near Damascus or in southern Syria, have been priority targets for Israel.
3. Syrian infrastructure
   Israeli strikes also targeted Syrian air defense systems and radars to weaken the regime’s ability to respond.

Israel’s current involvement in Syria

In 2024, Israel maintains an active posture in Syria, although its actions are less publicized. Current priorities include:

1. Preventing the transfer of advanced technologies
   Israel continues to target infrastructure used for manufacturing and storing precision missiles for Hezbollah.
2. Monitor Iranian activities
   Israel continues to closely monitor developments in southern Syria, where pro-Iranian militias seek to strengthen their presence despite Israeli strikes.
3. Maintain an effective deterrent
   Israel seeks to demonstrate its ability to act quickly and effectively to deter any hostile activity on its borders.

Regional consequences of Israeli involvement

Israel’s intervention in Syria has had significant repercussions:

1. Weakening of the Syrian regime
   Israeli strikes have significantly reduced the military capabilities of the Syrian regime, already weakened by a decade of civil war.
2. Escalation of tensions with Iran and Hezbollah
   Israeli actions have intensified rivalries with these actors, increasing the risk of direct confrontation.
3. International reactions
   While Israeli strikes are often tolerated by Western powers, they also attract criticism for their impact on civilians and Syrian sovereignty.

Israel should continue to favor an indirect approach, combining targeted strikes and local alliances to counter threats emanating from Syria. However, this strategy carries risks, including unintentional escalation with Iran or its allies. Furthermore, developments in international relations, notably the growing involvement of Russia and China in Syria, could limit Israeli room for maneuver.

References:

• Le Monde, August 28, 2024
• Foreign Policy, September 8, 2018
• Times of Israel, 15 mars 2021
• RFI, January 22, 2024
• Al-Monitor, 12 avril 2023

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