Ukraine-Russia War: Russian Deserter Reveals War Secrets of Protecting a Nuclear Base

On the day of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Anton says the nuclear weapons base where he was serving was put on high alert.

“Before that, we only did exercises. But the day the war started, the weapons were fully in place,” explains the former officer of the Russian nuclear forces. “We were prepared to launch forces at sea and in the air and, in theory, carry out a nuclear strike.

I met Anton at an undisclosed location outside Russia. For its own protection, the BBC will not reveal the location. We also changed his name and didn’t show his face.

Anton was an officer at a top-secret nuclear weapons facility in Russia.

He showed us documents confirming his unit, rank and base.

The BBC is unable to independently verify all of the events he described, although they match Russian statements at the time.

Three days after troops surged to Ukraine’s borders, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces had been placed on “special combat duty mode.”

Anton claims that combat alert was in place from the first day of the war and that his unit was “locked inside the base.”

“All we had was Russian state television,” says the former officer. “I didn’t really know what that meant. I carried out my tasks automatically. We were not participating in the war, we were just monitoring nuclear weapons.”

The state of alert was canceled after two or three weeks, he adds.

Anton’s testimony offers insight into the highly secretive inner workings of Russia’s nuclear forces. It is extremely rare for soldiers to speak to journalists.

“The selection process is very strict. Everyone is a professional soldier – there are no conscripts,” he explains.

“There are constant checks and lie detector tests for everyone. The pay is much higher and the troops are not sent to the front. They are there to repel or launch a nuclear strike. »

The former officer says life was tightly controlled.

“I had to make sure that the soldiers under my command did not bring any telephones to the nuclear base,” he explains.

“It’s a closed society, there are no outsiders. If you want your parents to visit you, you must submit an application to the FSB security service three months in advance.

Anton was part of the base security unit, a quick reaction force tasked with monitoring nuclear weapons.

“We were constantly doing training exercises. Our reaction time was two minutes,” he says with a touch of pride.

According to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia has approximately 4,380 operational nuclear warheads, but only 1,700 are “deployed” or ready for use. All NATO member states combined have a similar number.

There are also concerns about whether Putin might choose to deploy “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, often called tactics. These are smaller missiles that generally do not cause large-scale radioactive fallout.

Their use would nevertheless lead to a dangerous escalation of the war.

The Kremlin is doing everything it can to test the nerves of the West.

Just last week, Mr. Putin ratified changes to nuclear doctrine, the official rules dictating when and how Russia can launch nuclear weapons.

The doctrine now states that Russia can carry out launches if it is the subject of a “massive attack” by conventional missiles from a non-nuclear state, but “with the participation or support of a state nuclear”.

Russian officials say the updated doctrine “effectively eliminates” the possibility of battlefield defeat.

But is Russia’s nuclear arsenal fully functional?

Some Western experts have suggested that its weapons mostly date from the Soviet era and may not even work.

The former nuclear force officer rejected this view, saying it was a “very simplified view from so-called experts.”

“There may be some types of outdated weapons in some areas, but the country has a huge nuclear arsenal, a considerable amount of warheads, including constant combat patrols on land, in sea ​​and in the air.

Russian nuclear weapons are fully operational and combat ready, he said. “The work of maintaining nuclear weapons is carried out constantly, it never stops, even for a minute.

Shortly after the start of the full-scale war, Mr. Anton said he received what he describes as a “criminal order” to hold conferences with his troops using very specific written directives.

“They said that Ukrainian civilians were fighters and that they should be destroyed,” he exclaims. “It’s a red line for me, it’s a war crime. I said I would not spread this propaganda.”

Senior officers reprimanded Anton by transferring him to a regular assault brigade in another part of the country. He was told he would be sent to war.

These units are often sent into combat as the “first wave” and a number of Russian defectors have told the BBC that “troublemakers” who oppose the war have been used as “cannon fodder”.

The Russian embassy in London did not respond to a request for comment.

Before being sent to the front, Anton signed a statement refusing to participate in the war and a criminal case was opened against him. He showed us documents confirming his transfer to the assault brigade and the details of the criminal case.

He then decides to flee the country with the help of a voluntary organization of deserters.

“If I had fled from the nuclear base, the local FSB security service would have reacted decisively and I probably would not have been able to leave the country,” he said.

But he believes that because he was transferred to a regular assault brigade, the high-level security clearance system didn’t work.

Anton said he wanted the world to know that many Russian soldiers were opposed to the war.

The voluntary organization that helps deserters, “Idite Lesom” [« Go by the Forest », en anglais, ou « Get Lost »]told the BBC that the number of deserters seeking help was reaching 350 per month.

The risks faced by fugitives are also increasing. At least one deserter was killed after fleeing abroad, and there were several cases of men being forcibly returned to Russia and put on trial.

Although Anton has left Russia, he says the security services are still looking for him: “I take precautions here, I work undeclared and I don’t appear in any official system.

He said he stopped talking to his friends about the nuclear base because he could put them in danger: “They have to take lie detector tests, and any contact with me could result in a criminal case.”

But he has no illusions about the risk he himself runs by helping other soldiers escape.

“I understand that the more I do it, the more likely it is that they will try to kill me. »