Use of nuclear weapons: should we be worried about Vladimir Putin's new decree?

He chose to do so on the 1000th day of conflict with Ukraine. Vladimir Putin signed a decree this Tuesday expanding the possible uses of nuclear weapons, including in particular “the launch of ballistic missiles against Russia”. This “[adaptation] from our foundations to the current situation”in the words of Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, also follows the announcement, two days before, of the authorization given to kyiv to use American ATACMS missiles on Russian soil. This change in doctrine from the Biden administration, not official at this stage, would allow Ukrainian forces to penetrate approximately 300 kilometers into Russian territory.

A false green light?

Can the green light from Washington change the situation on the ground? Not decisively, according to many experts: widely anticipated by Moscow, it comes when the Russian army has already evacuated its contingents and its most sensitive equipment from the sensitive area that ATACMS missiles could reach. The number of missiles of this type that kyiv still has remains limited, and resupply is very uncertain with the imminent change of American government.

The decision of Joe Biden, who has only two months of mandate before him before handing over to Donald Trump, seems rather linked to the talks that his successor could open quickly after taking office. The possibility of striking in the Russian region of Kursk, where the Ukrainians gained a foothold at the end of the summer, may guarantee that kyiv retains one of the few levers it has for negotiations. Washington is also sending a signal to North Korea, which has sent at least 10,000 men to this region to support Russian troops, who now find themselves within range of Ukrainian strikes.

Vladimir Putin's reaction is not a surprise either. Last September, the Russian president had already warned that such a green light, which the Ukrainian president had been demanding for more than a year, would mean that “NATO countries are at war with Russia”. This interpretation opens the way to the “new doctrine” that he then proposed to his security council. According to the terms thereof, “aggression of Russia by a non-nuclear country but with the participation or support of a nuclear country” would be considered “as a joint attack on the Russian Federation”.

“We will consider such a possibility if we receive reliable information about the massive launch of aerospace means of attack and their crossing of the border of our state”specified Vladimir Putin. Which could be the case with ATACMS missile strikes on Russian territory, only the adjective “massif” leaving a margin of appreciation. The master of the Kremlin has allowed the nuclear threat to hover since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, at regular intervals, depending on the situation on the ground, as already noted by the CSIS (new window) in a strategic analysis last February. The American think tank estimated that the risk of the use of nuclear weapons was the highest in decades, never reached since the end of the Cold War.

The concept of a “red line” not to be crossed was brandished very early on by Moscow, to discourage the interventionist desires of Ukraine's allies. Threats to which the Western bloc promised to respond if they came true, while maintaining strategic ambiguity on the means that would be used or the proportionality of the response.

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Russia had brought tactical nuclear weapons closer to the theater of war in the summer of 2023, by positioning an arsenal with its Belarusian ally, in northern Ukraine and within firing range of kyiv. A movement carried out to intimidate Western supporters of Ukraine, believes the CSIS. The American institute, however, strongly recommends not to relativize the nuclear threat, which according to it is one of the objectives of Russian propaganda. Moscow's references to nuclear weapons seem to multiply when its army suffers setbacks on the ground, note the authors of the study. Which is not the case this time, while the Russian army has been making significant progress in the Donbass for several months.