Floods in Spain: is Europe prepared for the increase in water-related climate disasters?

On October 19, 2024, the Valencia region of Spain was hit by massive flooding, killing several hundred people and causing considerable economic losses. A real trauma for Spain, which did not seem prepared for such a natural disaster, and which aroused the anger of the population towards its local and national leaders. This tragic event questions the capacity of Europe, particularly the Mediterranean, to deal with climate change. Could the Spanish authorities have better anticipated the bad weather? Should we expect the emergence of water-related conflicts in Europe? How are armies prepared for water stress? Update with Éléonore Duffau, researcher at IRIS in the Climate, Energy and Security program, where she specializes in strategic and security issues linked to climate change.

Several hundred people have died following massive flooding in the Valencia region of Spain. Could this region expect such a disaster? How can we understand the scale of the disaster and the human tragedy?

Several environmental, climatic and political elements must be taken into account to understand the scale of this disaster. On the one hand, the Spanish Mediterranean coast, and in particular the Valencia region, regularly experiences the meteorological phenomenon of the “cold drop”, an isolated depression at high altitude which can cause sudden and extremely violent rains, sometimes for several days. This isolated depression encountered highly moisture-laden winds from the eastern Mediterranean coast, resulting in the formation of thunderstorms with torrential downpours in the Mediterranean. These showers were reinforced by very high humidity in the air, which can be explained by the increase in air temperature in the Mediterranean. Thus, climate change accentuated the extent of this cold drop, which was extremely violent and which took residents and authorities by surprise.

We must also emphasize human responsibility in this disaster, with on the one hand the exacerbation of climate vulnerabilities through land-use planning policies and on the other hand a lack of responsiveness and coordination in crisis management policies. First of all, the concentration of populations and the urbanization of Mediterranean coastlines represent additional vulnerability for residents in the face of extreme weather events. Massive urbanization (nearly 40% of the coastline is built) aggravates the consequences of extreme precipitation, particularly due to the artificialization of soils, which slows down the water absorption capacity of the soil, and intensifies the phenomena of runoff. On the Spanish coast, which is very urbanized and therefore very artificial, the soils have also been dried out in recent years by droughts, which increases their impermeability. Finally, 500,000 people live in flood zones in the Valencia region, illustrating a lack of consideration of the risks associated with weather events. We must therefore rethink land use planning in order to ensure the resilience of societies in the face of these increasing climatic events.

Finally, the dramatic results of these floods call into question the crisis management mechanisms adopted by the autonomous community of Valencia and the Spanish government. The alerts issued by the Spanish Meteorological Institute were not taken seriously enough by the regional government, which was slow to alert residents and mobilize military emergency units (UME). Thus, the lives of many people were put in danger by these failings. In addition, people have adopted risky behaviors such as trying to take their car out of a garage. Experts highlight the lack of risk perception for authorities and residents. It is therefore crucial to develop a culture of risk among populations so that everyone understands the actions to adopt to protect themselves and others in the event of flooding, and more broadly in the event of climatic disasters. Finally, the disaster highlighted tensions linked to the distribution of powers between the levels of Spanish governance: the federal state and the autonomous communities, and between the parties in power at these levels (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party at the federal level, and Popular Party in the Valencia region). According to some observers, the scale of this disaster shows that the Spanish autonomous state model is not adapted to deal with such emergencies.

The Spanish royal family, visiting the scene of the disaster, suffered invective from the population. To what extent can water disasters linked to climate change be a source of tension or conflict?

The conflict potential of water is a growing issue within geostrategic analyses, taking into account climate change and the scarcity of the resource. Water resources can be defined as a priority, and therefore water stress as a major security risk. However, even if water wars seem particularly predominant in the analysis of the intersection between conflicts and water, many researchers qualify these meanings and offer a less alarmist narrative. Thus, it is very unlikely that conventional interstate wars will be triggered by water stress in Southern Europe, particularly thanks to the European regulatory and political framework. However, the resource is the source of tensions at the local level, regarding its appropriation, management or exploitation.

Conflicts of use around water resources in Southern Europe were referenced between 2000 and 2024 by the Defense and Climate Observatory as part of the new note on the security issues of water stress. This data collection shows an increase in this type of conflict in frequency and intensity in Southern Europe between 2000 and 2024, particularly in France, in connection with basins intended for agriculture. In Spain, the numerous dams and attempts to transfer water seem to be at the heart of conflicts linked to water resources. For example, the project to transfer water from the Tagus to the Segura is a significant source of tension. This ambitious engineering project dating from the 1980s was designed to transport water from the Tagus River in central Spain to the Segura River in the Southeast and has led to ongoing disputes between regions over rights. water, the environmental impacts and the economic consequences of such a transfer. More precisely, the region of Murcia requires additional quantities of water in order to meet the needs of the regional tourism sector, which contrasts it with the region of Castilla-la Mancha which would like to avoid the transfer of water to devote it to agricultural uses. Finally, dams are often denounced during rallies for their negative impact on the environment and aquatic ecosystems. These demonstrations can provoke strong police repression, as in October 2012 in Aragon, during a gathering of ecologists and residents of the town of Artieda, who risked the expropriation of their land because of the increase in the size of a water tank.

The Defense and Climate Observatory is publishing a report on water stress in Europe and how the armies are preparing for it. Have European armies already integrated the issue of water into their doctrine?

The European armed forces on the Mediterranean shore are gradually taking into account the issues linked to water stress. In France, the Ministry of the Armed Forces, for example, has adopted a ministerial water strategy, which aims to protect water resources and anticipate disruptions in the water cycle for health, missions, infrastructure and equipment of the armed forces. However, the degree of integration by the French armies of issues linked to water resources varies between external operations (OPEX) and activities taking place on national territory. In the first case, water management is already advanced, thanks to the experience acquired in French military projection zones subject to more difficult environmental and water conditions (Sahel, Afghanistan, Romania, Lebanon, etc.). On the national territory, the French armies especially play a key role in responding to water crisis situations, in the context of droughts, floods, or fires. The objectives defined in the water strategy will make it possible to better understand the uses of water by the armed forces, and therefore to study the room for maneuver to reduce withdrawals.

Thus, the French armies, but also the Italian, Spanish or Portuguese armies, have adopted structural and holistic military strategies for water issues through policies to improve infrastructure and reduce water withdrawals and consumption. In Italy, for example, the army has implemented a system for measuring and monitoring the water consumption of rights-of-way, and a strategy for the rational use of available water resources. Likewise, the ministry launched the project Green Barracks in 2019 in order to renovate the water and energy infrastructure of 26 barracks. The Spanish Ministry of Defense has also developed a plan for the prevention and remediation of contaminated land on military sites, which integrates issues related to surface water and groundwater. In Portugal, objectives attest to a desire to transform practices within the Ministry of Defense, through the strengthening of pollutant controls, or the reuse of treated wastewater, reaching up to 50% for certain bases.

However, other countries, such as Slovenia, adhere to a less transformative and more technocentric and reactive vision when faced with these issues. Finally, Greece serves as a special case, because little information deals with water management within the army. Paradoxically, Greece is experiencing a critical situation regarding the availability of the resource, but was at the initiative in 2016 of a promising and relatively avant-garde military cooperation on water management entitled Smart Blue Water Camp. If cooperation is common in water governance, it is rarer in the military domain, particularly in the context of OPEX where the desire to maintain logistical autonomy prevails.