Is Marshal Haftar's Libya emerging strengthened after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria? This is the question that arises, given the risk for the Russians of losing their military bases in Syria. Will there soon be a Russian naval base in Tobruk? The great expert on Libya Wolfram Lacher is a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. RFI first asked him if, after the loss of their Syrian ally, the Russians were not going to turn even more towards Marshal Haftar.
RFI: Wolfram Lacher, if the Russians lose their point of support in Syria, won't they turn even more towards Marshal Haftar's Libya?
Wolfram Lacher: They'll probably try it, but will they be able to? Will Haftar allow the Russians to strengthen their presence in Libya? This is a question, because we have seen through recent years that Haftar has always sought to juggle several foreign partners and never make himself dependent exclusively on one state.
In the Libyan territory controlled by Marshal Haftar, the Russians would have facilities on four air bases: al-Qadeer, al-Joufra, Ghardabiya and Brak ak-Shati. But can Russian jumbo jets reach Libya without stopping en route to refuel?
It probably depends on the airspaces they can cross. However, we observed this last year that they can cross Turkish airspace, for example. But it is very possible, if Russia lost the air base in Syria, that it would complicate logistics, resupply for the Russian presence in Libya and further south in Africa.
As for combat ships, if the Russians lose their naval base at Tartous in Syria, will they be able to withdraw their boats to a Libyan port?
So the Russians have been seeking for several years now to establish a naval base in the east of Libya. So far, Haftar and his sons have never granted this request because they know it could sever their relations with Western powers. Now, the current situation where both Russia and the United States and other countries in the region – so the United Arab Emirates, the Egyptians, everyone – are trying to maintain good relations with Haftar, it is a situation very comfortable for Haftar and therefore I think that, for Haftar, there would be no necessity to now offer Libyan territory to the Russians and to make itself exclusively dependent on Russian support and to cut off its relations with Western countries.
Apparently, Marshal Haftar and Vladimir Putin get along well. They saw each other in Moscow last September. But is the Libyan marshal as reliable an ally as the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was?
He may not be reliable in the sense that he follows the directives that we would try to give him, but Haftar needs this Russian military presence because the function of protection against possible attacks, possible offensives from the forces in Tripolitania, this protective function that the Russian military presence has, it is difficult to see another foreign power replacing it for Haftar. So, this is why the relationship between Haftar and Russia is one that is mutually beneficial. Both need to maintain this relationship.
For six months, Marshal Haftar, who is 81 years old, has been preparing his succession. He highlights one of his sons, Saddam. Last June, when Saddam Haftar went to Ndjamena, the Chadian president asked him to put the Chadian Fact rebels under cover, whose last offensive in 2021 had cost the life of Idriss Déby. Do you think that the Haftar clan responded to the Chadian regime's request?
Yes, indeed. For about two years there has been quite close cooperation. There were arrests of rebel leaders, including within Fact, who were handed over to the Chadian regime. And to my knowledge, Fact no longer has a presence as a force in Libyan territory at the moment.
And the Fact today is no longer able to launch a new offensive as in April 2021?
Today, I believe that there are no Chadian rebel forces in Libyan territory that are capable of launching a similar offensive. On the other hand, we will have to see if, with the fact that France is withdrawing its forces from Chad, this is not a factor which could lead to a new mobilization of Chadian rebels who could therefore organize new groups, whether in Darfur or elsewhere in the countries surrounding Chad.
