By Yves Petit, Professor at the University of Lorraine, Director of the European University Center of Nancy
The opposition of the French political class
In France, the negative effects of the agreement are particularly badly experienced among farmers. They would primarily result from imports of beef, poultry and sugar. The President of the Republic spoke at the end of the European Council on October 17, 2024 in the following terms: “We demand substantial compliance with the Paris agreements (of 2015 on climate), mirror clauses, and protection interests of European industries and farmers. The EU-Mercosur agreement should therefore enable compliance with the climate commitments of the various parties, not lead to an increase in imported deforestation, and make exports of agri-food products to the EU conditional on compliance with environmental and health standards through mirror clauses. . In order to respond to protests from Brazil and facilitate the conclusion of the agreement, at the request of the EPP and Germany, the European Parliament decided to postpone for one year the application of the European regulation on imported deforestation, which aims to ban the importation of coffee, cocoa or beef from deforested lands. The unraveling of this text on deforestation was the victim of an alliance between the right and the far right in the European Parliament, which is a first!
In an appeal published in mid-November by the Journal Le Monde, more than 600 French parliamentarians wrote to the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, very favorable to the agreement, in order to present their position: “The conditions for the adoption of an agreement with Mercosur are not met”. The signatories insist on the deforestation of an area equivalent to the Iberian Peninsula in the Amazon. The Cerrado, neighboring the Amazon rainforest, is also very affected, leading to a change in land use in favor of cattle breeding and soy production, in contradiction with the obligations set by the Paris agreement . Brazil and Argentina use almost twice as many pesticides as France per cultivated hectare, a significant part of which is banned in Europe, and also growth promoters in the livestock sector. For French parliamentarians, the opening of additional quotas (for example 99,000 tonnes of beef or 180,000 tonnes of poultry), without customs duties or with reduced duties, goes against the interests of national producers. This “guilty naivety” promotes distortions of competition to the detriment of European agriculture.
While the President of the Republic seems to have run out of arguments to change the position of the European Commission, the French government announced on November 19, 2024 that it would activate article 50-1 of the 1958 Constitution. It allows to organize a parliamentary debate with a vote on a specific subject, without liability being incurred. Held on November 26, 2024, the National Assembly opposed the signing of the EU-Mercosur FTA by 484 votes in favor of the adopted declaration and 70 against. In the name of defending farmers, the next day, the Senate also demanded that France refuse the agreement as it stands. The rejection came almost unanimously by 338 votes out of a total of 348 Senators.
In order to oppose the adoption of the agreement, France can thus rely on the almost unanimity of its Parliament (except the LFI group) and put forward a united front of refusal making it possible to strengthen the French position at the European level. These votes could also make the President of the Commission more hesitant to want to conclude the agreement at all costs, and encourage the creation of a blocking minority at European level.
Is the meeting of a blocking minority possible?
If the path is narrow, a parameter to take into consideration to prevent the conclusion of this trade agreement is the possibility for France to succeed in bringing together a blocking minority allowing opposition to the approval of the agreement. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, to be adopted by qualified majority, a decision must obtain the support of 15 Member States representing 65% of the Union's population. To prevent the adoption of a text, a blocking minority must be made up of at least four member states; three large member states cannot block the vote on a text, even if they bring together more than 35% of the population. .
For the moment, 11 member states (notably Germany, Spain and Portugal) have explicitly expressed their support for the conclusion of this free trade agreement. The figure of 15 member states has therefore not been reached, and the positions of certain member states are complex to grasp. Recently, in Italy, while the Minister of Agriculture spoke out against the agreement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared himself favorable “in principle” to its conclusion. If at the end of June 2019, following the political agreement reached, France could count on the support of Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands, only Austria maintains a firm opposition, after a vote by its Parliament . Since November 26, France has been able to count on the support of Poland (more than 36 million inhabitants) which opposes the EU-Mercosur agreement, the agricultural component being considered unacceptable. The issue of agricultural imports from Ukraine is not unrelated. In a significant number of member states, a reawakening of peasant anger against the EU-Mercosur agreement is feared. The positions of several member states are perhaps only tactical, with the constitution of a blocking minority remaining uncertain, particularly due to the return of agricultural mobilizations.
Building a blocking minority will therefore not be easy, especially since we must certainly avoid dividing the European Union. Should we then demand more transparency, in order to better understand the ins and outs of this commercial negotiation? The negotiation is indeed frequently criticized for taking place in opacity and should we not review the negotiating mandate given to the European Commission 25 years ago, because it mentions neither the climate nor biodiversity? Several member states have just reaffirmed strong opposition to the agreement and, according to certain MEPs, it is not excluded that France could still bring together a blocking minority in the Council. Different points of view within the political groups of the European Parliament do not make rejection impossible either.
Towards a rapid adoption of the agreement, overriding France's opposition?
Despite France's body and soul opposition, a question arises: will (can) the European Commission override this? Several elements must be taken into consideration to answer this question.
A first observation is essential: since the result of the European elections of June 6-9, 2024 and the “failed” dissolution decided immediately by the President of the Republic, France is no longer in a position of strength within the institutions European, and it can weigh less easily in this difficult and complex debate. During the final political decisions, the European Commission will still have to take its responsibilities and take into account the French and Polish positions, at the risk of reinforcing Euroscepticism, or even increasing rejection of European construction.
Several factors, above all geopolitical, are put forward in favor of concluding the agreement: – climate crisis; – Russian war of aggression in Ukraine; – increased American protectionism following the election of Donald Trump and risk of trade tensions; – strategy of “ derisking » vis-à-vis China, by sourcing strategic minerals from Latin America. China could also take advantage of European procrastination to strengthen its commercial positions with the Mercosur countries, and take the place left vacant by the EU. A final notable element is that France has a trade surplus with Mercosur.
To reach the conclusion of the agreement, the European Commission would plan to split the agreement with Mercosur, into a political part (including for example investment protection clauses) and a commercial part, in order to prevent the hypothesis of rejection by a national Parliament. The split with a commercial party including customs duties, import quotas and provisions on sustainability would make it possible to circumvent France's opposition. This could be adopted by qualified majority by the Council of the EU, without requiring the ratification of national Parliaments, whereas in principle it is the entire agreement which is subject to a vote at the unanimity of the Member States, then a vote by the European Parliament, as well as ratification by the 27 Member States according to their respective procedures (approval by the National Assembly and the Senate in France).
Finally, according to leaked information, the Commission is trying to somehow coax France and conclude the agreement despite everything, by providing for the creation of a compensation fund for European farmers negatively affected by its implementation. implemented, which would amount to an implicit recognition of its harmful nature for certain European agricultural products. It seems inappropriate for the EU to end the negotiations without real political impetus, although the current geopolitical situation certainly argues in favor of their completion.
This article was written before government censorship.
