The Cross : Will Donald Trump's return to the White House necessarily lead to abandoning Ukraine?
Sam Greene : I highly doubt it, because I just don't see what he would get out of it. Donald Trump is certainly a “deal maker”, and he perhaps wants this war to end. But the goal of a deal is to be the beneficiary. What would he gain by abandoning Ukraine to Russia? Can Vladimir Putin offer him something in return to make an agreement acceptable which would create a lot of discontent in Washington, including within his own party? Indeed, many Republican elected officials in Congress remain committed to supporting Ukraine. However, even though there may be a certain understanding on a personal level with Putin, Donald Trump's first term from 2017 to 2021 demonstrated that there was no convergence of interests between Russia and the States. -United. And this is still not the case today.
Don't you think that cutting military aid to Ukraine, which amounts to tens of billions, is enough to justify this deal for Donald Trump?
S. G. : I don't pretend to have a perfect understanding of Trump's cost-benefit analysis. But this saving would in my opinion be a marginal gain, out of proportion to the apparent cost of letting Russia crush Ukraine.
Donald Trump said he could “solve” the war in Ukraine in just 24 hours. Should this statement be taken seriously?
S. G. : Donald Trump can perfectly well decide in the first twenty-four hours of his presidency to put an end to sending aid to Ukraine. But this will not end the war, because Ukrainians want to continue fighting. This will make the fight more difficult for kyiv, and will push Europeans to think about the importance they attach to this war for their own security. If Trump thinks the entire war is in his hands, he is wrong. Especially since I am not sure that Vladimir Putin has any interest in negotiating.
Because the military situation is now favorable to him?
S. G. : Yes, and because it did not achieve its main goal, which is the political subjugation of Ukraine. But there is also the fact that the regime is now based on war, the only thing that is causing Russian GDP to increase today. Only productive sectors linked to the army are progressing, boosted by the increase in the military budget. Everything else stagnates or declines. If Russian incomes have increased, it is due to the need for workers in the arms industry and the sharp increase in salaries and recruitment bonuses in the army. All this greatly stimulated the economy. But if the war ends, Russia will face a recession and very high inflation. This is why the price of stopping the war seems prohibitive to me.
Beyond the economy, what would be the political risks of a negotiated peace for Vladimir Putin's regime?
S. G. :The sanctions greatly impoverished Russian political elites, but their losses were offset by new revenue opportunities linked to the increased military budget and the resumption of foreign assets abandoned or seized after the invasion. Without war, these revenues will decline and loyalties may shift.
Which brings up the question of repression. Currently, the regime justifies it by presenting this war as “existential” for Russia. If peace returns, this security justification will disappear, and the repression will clearly appear politically motivated. This is something that authoritarian regimes don't like at all. So I don't see what Putin would do with a friend in the White House. He needs America to continue playing its bogeyman role.
Leaving aside lasting peace, would a temporary ceasefire be in Russia's interests?
S. G. : I don't think so, especially if this ceasefire is accompanied by an element of deterrence, like the deployment of European troops in Ukraine for example. Vladimir Putin could agree to temporarily lower the intensity of the conflict, but he will want to retain the possibility of raising the temperature as he wishes. And if by chance this pause gives Ukraine the opportunity to make rapid progress towards the European Union or NATO, then it will continue to fight. Some people think that only NATO poses a problem, but that seems wrong to me: I remind you that the root of this war is the crisis around the signing of the association agreement with the European Union in 2013.
What would the relationship between Europe and Russia look like in the event of a ceasefire?
S. G. : For the domestic political reasons that I have stated, I believe that Russia will have to maintain a very high level of military spending, which will make the countries on the eastern flank of Europe very on edge, and will in turn push them to increase their defense investments. Even if an agreement would lead to a reduction in violence in Ukraine, I am not certain that we will emerge from the confrontation with Russia.
In the event that the “deal” promised by Donald Trump does not take place, what would happen?
S. G. : There are other negotiations that matter: those between the United States and Europe on aid to Ukraine, and those between the United States and kyiv on the security guarantees that Washington can offer on the long term. On these two segments, Donald Trump will have a negative impact. He will seek to obtain a “victory” by extracting significant compensation from the Europeans and the Ukrainians in exchange for the aid he agrees to offer. This will undermine their confidence in the United States. The Europeans will be forced to find at home the resources that Washington will no longer want to devote to Ukraine. I think they are aware of it. The question now is whether they will manage to stay united, or whether budgetary imperatives and internal political constraints will ultimately prevail.
