Supply lines through Tobruk are already established. However, with limited repair facilities and no dry dock, few berths of sufficient size, and limited opportunities for expansion, long-term investment in a permanent presence would likely present technical challenges. Tobruk was never a primary naval facility for the Libyan Navy and thus has limited dedicated military infrastructure. A port in the area would also share a harbour with a commercial port which is busier than Tartus (Latakia was more central to Syrian commerce). Since Tartus itself was made viable despite being a port with limited capacity, this might be deemed acceptable, and these are not insurmountable constraints. However, building maintenance facilities, munitions storage sites and berths will still prove time-consuming. While sharing a harbour with civilian vessels thus poses challenges, there are also some advantages. The commercial facilities of Tobruk and Benghazi could also provide Russia with an opportunity to replace its planned hub for agricultural exports in Tartus, a project into which it had planned to invest $500 million and which was meant to expand its footprint as an agricultural exporter in the Middle East and North Africa.
Benghazi port, also within Haftar’s influence and potentially more welcoming of a Russian presence, has a greater capacity that Tobruk. It is a key port for bringing in humanitarian aid and boasts more comprehensive maintenance facilities which have serviced vessels from the nearby Benghazi naval facility, although much of its infrastructure remains unusable due to conflict damage. Moreover, the area around Benghazi within the Gulf of Sidra provides more usable space for dedicated military facilities, which might limit the need to operate in close proximity to civilian traffic. For example, Haftar’s Libyan National Army appears to be intent on building both air and naval facilities in the vicinity of Benghazi. Arguably, this could present opportunities to invest and establish a presence in the medium term, but Russia will be either building or supporting the construction of infrastructure from a low baseline in terms of existing facilities.
Then there is the question of political risk. Any Russian presence in Libya would at a minimum be dependent on Turkish goodwill, given Turkey’s naval advantages in the region and its capacity to further support the Libyan Government of National Accord. This might be tolerable for Russia, since this was arguably true in Syria as well. However, unlike Assad, Haftar is not altogether an international pariah and maintains a working relationship with France, for example. Russia may find negotiating additional access more challenging than was the case in Syria. Pressure from Haftar’s other partners might not lead to a denial of access given that Russia remains his most important backer, but might condition the nature of the access provided. For example, the terms of access might come to resemble those offered to the Russians by Hafez al-Assad, with the navy prevented from maintaining many shore-based facilities and compelled to use harbour-based auxiliary vessels to support maintenance. Moreover, should Haftar come to see other alignments as being more beneficial than the Russian relationship, the eviction of Russian assets cannot be ruled out, much as occurred in Sadat’s Egypt. Admittedly, these remain very distant prospects, and it should not be presumed that Russia could not secure an additional base in Libya. However, dependence on a partner which is not an international pariah – and which is therefore subject to more complex demands and influences – is more fraught with political risk for Russia.
Conclusions
It may be the case that Russia retains access to Tartus as a function of an arrangement with Syria’s new rulers. However, if the Russian navy loses this access, it will not cease to be a regional player, but its presence will be far more diluted. Access arrangements would be a poor substitute for the presence at Tartus, and even basing rights in Libya (the most likely substitute for Syria) would not initially provide a substitute for the in-region maintenance that Tartus allowed. Moreover, any partners upon whom Russia might rely are not as wholly dependent on it as Assad was, posing long-term political risks. Russia’s days as a regional player in the Mediterranean may not be numbered per se, but its access and capacity to maintain a meaningful presence could become far less assured.
© RUSSIANS, 2025
-The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors’, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.
For terms of use, see Website Ts&Cs of Use.
Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to [email protected] and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.
