Interview
December 3, 2024
After a decade in the 2010s marked by a significant French military presence in West Africa, notably through operations Serval and Barkhane, the 2020s appear to be those of an inexorable decline in its influence on the continent. The sequence of coups d'état in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) had led to a profound rupture between these Sahel states and Paris. This November 28, the announcement by Ndjamena concerning the termination of the defense agreements between France and Chad, just a few hours after the visit of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, further reinforced this dynamic. In what context does this decision by Chad come? Why did the country make this choice? What could be the consequences? What future for French influence in Africa? Update with Francis Laloupo, associate researcher at IRIS, specialist in African geopolitics.
What is the history of relations between France and Chad in terms of defense and security?
After the agreement signed in 1976 and revised in 2019, this cooperation was marked by specific operations. Among the most emblematic, Operation Manta, established in the early 1980s and intended to counter Libya's desire for territorial expansion, while ensuring the protection of the Chadian regime against internal threats. Presented as an actor contributing to the “stabilization” of Chad, the French army has often been designated as an element supporting the regime in place, disinclined to promote democratic progress. The establishment of Operation Épervier, from 1986 to 2014, made it possible to establish the French presence over the long term, with the establishment of military bases. This system, based on a so-called privileged relationship with successive regimes, has made Chad an essential point of support for Paris' security policy and a historic strategic pole of French influence in sub-Saharan Africa. It is within the framework of this reinforced cooperation that the Chadian contingents moved towards Mali in support of Operation Serval in 2013, to combat armed terrorist groups (GAT). Subsequently, Chad hosted the operational headquarters of Operation Barkhane. At the same time as Paris was busy establishing its military presence in this region, the Chadian army acquired a laudatory reputation in the fight against jihadist groups.
How can we understand Chad's announcement of a termination of cooperation agreements with France?
First, it must be remembered that this is not the first time that the French military presence has been called into question in this country. Since 1975, political actors, both from the ruling class and the opposition, have periodically called for the departure of French forces. Three days after the press release released on November 28 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Head of State, Mahamat Déby Itno, gave an explanation of the text, to clarify that the announced break “only concerns the military cooperation agreement in its current configuration. He underlined the obsolescence of an agreement unsuitable for current security, geopolitical and strategic realities, and for the full expression of Chad's sovereignty. For the moment, unlike the countries of the Sahel Alliance (AES) – Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso – which have chosen a conflictual distance with France, Chad indicates that its decision does not mean a breakdown in the partnership history with France, and the end of security cooperation, in its current form, should be organized in a concerted and gradual manner.
In what domestic and regional context does this position of Chad take place?
It must be seen in the context of the ongoing changes in the political space since the death in 2021 of President Idriss Déby Itno. With the accession to power of his son Mahamat Déby Itno, the new executive must deal with the different political currents and opinions in order to establish a certain form of legitimacy. The question is to ensure the continuity of a system, while producing signs of rupture attesting to a new form of governance. In this regard, we must take into account the centrality of the security issue in this country marked, for decades, by episodes of politico-military conflicts, and today confronted with the problem of GAT. Chad's gesture towards France is based on two arguments: on the one hand, a rereading of the basis and relevance of military agreements marked by colonial history, and on the other hand, the stated desire of the country to diversify its partnerships. Since 2022, the Chadian executive has worked to bring about rapprochement with new “strategic” partners, such as Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Hungary. In the background of this decision by Chad, political upheavals and rearrangements of diplomatic alliances are at work in the Sahel, and more generally in West Africa.
What factors contributed to these upheavals?
We can note, among other things: the alteration of the French strategy of military influence in the Sahel in recent years, the pressure of opinions opposed to the maintenance of French military bases perceived as a neocolonial symbol, the processes of diversification of partnerships engaged by African states, the exacerbation of rivalries between great powers, Russia's offensives on the continent, the shock and consequences of the information war waged by Moscow in French-speaking countries south of the Sahara…
Could France anticipate Chad's decision?
After the forced withdrawal of the Barkhane force from the Sahel in 2022, Paris announced a reconfiguration or resizing of its military system, particularly in West and Central Africa. The objective was to have a less visible presence on a military level. In June 2024, the announcement was made of a drastic reduction in workforce, in all the countries concerned. While France is forced, due to geopolitical developments, to rethink its military presence in its political dimension, it was clearly taken by surprise by the somewhat spectacular act carried out by Chad. Perhaps because faced with the current movements in the countries of its former territory, it is no longer the master of the clocks. Ndjamena's decision in some way represents the end of an era, that of French external operations (OPEX) on the continent.
What impact could this French withdrawal have for Chad in regional dynamics, marked by instability and conflicts?
If Chad can count on the expertise of its defense forces to confront security threats, the authorities are well aware that the fight against non-state armed groups cannot be conducted alone. In the short and medium term, the decision taken by Ndjamena will not significantly change the management of the security situation in the country and its immediate regional environment. We will need to remain attentive to the way in which leaders design the new guidelines for military cooperation. Among the probable options, a reformatting of military cooperation with France, based on technical and logistical support, or on one-off strategic partnership modules; to this last scenario could be added the integration of new partners such as Russia and Turkey, among others. However, such an alloy does not offer, a priori, the guarantees of operational or even diplomatic compatibility between the different external actors thus called upon.
To what extent could France's strategic rivals, starting with Russia, benefit from the new situation?
It would be interesting to know the terms of the rapprochement noted over the past few months between the Chadian and Russian authorities. Could Chad in turn switch to Russia's assistance protocol, like that currently observed in the AES countries? President Mahamat Idriss Déby made it clear that “Chad is in no way in the logic of replacing one power by another, even less in an approach of change of master”. While it is true that a French withdrawal from Chad could constitute an additional political gain for Russia in this region, Chad's internal situation is, in many respects, very different from that of its AES neighbors. It is doubtful that enclosing Ndjamena solely in Russia's assistance protocol will produce the necessary and sufficient responses to its various internal problems. Regarding the security equation, the experience of the AES regimes clearly demonstrates that exclusive cooperation with Russia is far from producing the expected results. We are witnessing more of an expansion of the threat and terrorist violence than of their containment.
While Senegal has also just announced its desire to see French troops leave its territory, and they have already had to leave the rest of the Sahel, what place can France still occupy on the African continent?
It is also important to underline the specificity of the Senegalese case and context. The question of closing the French military base and withdrawing soldiers is not new there. It was formulated by President Abdoulaye Wade during his two mandates, between 2000 and 2012. This position of Senegal has significantly fueled reflections on French bases in Africa over the last two decades. The current executive, in place since April 2024, has undertaken a reformulation of this demand, integrating it into a nationalist and sovereignist ideological corpus which constitutes the basis of its mandate and one of the chapters of its electoral promises. As part of the reconfiguration of the French military presence, Paris had notably considered retaining 100 soldiers among the 350 still present in Senegal. Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye therefore prefers a total elimination of the military base, while advocating a diversification of external partnerships. This sequence symbolically underlines the need for Paris to definitively settle the burden which has always weighed on a form of military presence inseparable, in the eyes of public opinion, from the colonial past. It is now understood that the traditional ostentation of the military tool has become less relevant, even anachronistic, given the changes underway in the countries concerned. France, like other powers, is required to produce diplomatic options that are more in tune with the expectations of its African partners, almost seven decades after independence. It is perhaps on this condition that it will be able, in the future, to maintain margins of action in an African context where rivalries between external powers are currently reaching an exceptional intensity.
