Interview with Vincent Tiberj conducted by Clémence Mary and Victor Boiteau
This is the book to put in the hands of Emmanuel Macron and the political leaders who refuse to hear the victory of the New Popular Front in the last legislative elections and who pose as obvious the idea that France is moving to the right. There are many, political leaders and editorialists relying on the scores of the National Rally, to affirm this leaning to the right, the desire of a society for a return to the conservative and traditional values of the right – rejection of immigration, family, order, merit. In a book to be published on September 4, French Right-Wing: Myth and Reality (PUF), sociologist and professor at Sciences-Po Bordeaux Vincent Tiberj deconstructs this discourse. While he already expects a trial of naivety, the researcher defends the thesis, with statistical data to support it, of a shift to the right not of citizens but of the political and media scene, out of step with a society that is more tolerant than half a century ago.
Did you send your book to Emmanuel Macron, who spent seven years chasing votes from the right?
I don’t know [rires]. The Macronists and right-wing political leaders consider that they still have a move to play and refuse to hear what the French expressed on July 7: an attachment to another society, to the values of the Republic, an openness to others, to another pension reform.
You wrote most of your book before the European and then legislative elections. Did they change anything for you?
These elections were a crash test for my thesis. The European elections illustrate the idea of a “great resignation” on the part of post-baby boom voters and millennials: those who vote are increasingly conservative and less and less representative, while those who abstain could be reserves for the left. The novelty of the RN (National Rally) lies in its ability to seduce conservatives among the sixty- and seventy-year-olds who previously did not allow themselves to vote. The first round of the legislative elections showed how strong the right and the far right could be, while the second round and the victory of the NFP (New Popular Front) tell a different story, the possibility of remobilizing a society, not necessarily through support but first to express something as a citizen. What we saw in these elections is a divergence between what is happening on the political scene and in society.
These election results seem to argue in favor of a shift to the right of the French…
This is a deception. There is no rightward shift from below, among citizens, but from above, on the political and media scene. It is the campaigns that shape voters. As a result, certain values have more weight in the ballot boxes than they had before; other values could structure the political field differently. These are disadvantaged because we do not talk about them. And the citizens who can support them are not those who have a constant relationship with voting. There is also a paradox: long-term cultural developments on homosexuality, gender relations, immigration and socio-economic aspects are not reflected in the ballot boxes, because of this divergence between citizens and voters.
How do you explain this gap between the absence of a shift to the right “from below” and the progress of the extreme right at the ballot box?
An election is a set of phenomena. The most important are the themes structuring the campaign. The parties play on strings of values, politicize them. Socio-economic issues, inequalities, public services, are not a favorable terrain for the right. During a campaign on insecurity, “wokeism” or immigration, it is the left that plays defense. At the same time, the old relationship to voting and parties, the surrender of oneself to elected officials, no longer works. All this does not allow voters who could mobilize to do so, and the rightward shift from above ends up trickling down. It allows conservative citizens to feel legitimate and less alone. It is a question of cultural hegemony. We saw it during the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games, citizens heard political and media figures put words to a certain malaise that they could feel. For the left, the environmental issue has all the potential to become the next great divide, with social and territorial dimensions. It is one of the next avenues of ideological restructuring, especially if the left manages to link it to the social issue.
What tools do you use to measure these changes in tolerance?
How to measure what citizens think is as old as democracy itself. “The field tells us that…”, “the French think that…” are classic questions raised by oppositions and political majorities alike, but also by the media and intellectuals who use them to position themselves. We have more and more ways to understand what citizens say about society, on social networks for example. Behind this, it is the use of surveys that raises questions. A plethora of surveys are conducted online with access panels [panel créé par un institut de sondage, ndlr] who have political biases, thus leading to an over-declaration of the RN vote. And therefore the conservative part of society. For my part, I work on quantity, with a cumulative approach to all available opinion data. Thinking about the shift to the right is reflected in the long term, keeping in mind that the polls are not perfect, that the questions can be biased, particularly on immigration. It is by accumulating series that we obtain a fluid and robust approach to opinion data.
What conclusions did you reach?
From the 1970s to today, French society has made considerable progress on cultural issues such as tolerance of homosexuality. Since the mid-1980s, things have also progressed a lot on immigration, biological racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, the acceptance of the children of immigrants as being French like the others. The more recent a generation, the less xenophobia there is among them. This does not mean that all young people are tolerant. And when it comes to tolerance, there are ups and downs, moments of tension or progress.
Which ones, for example?
The 2005 riots [1] were a moment of striking tension that lowered the tolerance index, because they were framed as those of immigration and linked to Islam. After the attacks of 2015, it is the opposite, we are witnessing a moment of impressive progression. It is not the event as such that creates xenophobia but the way in which we talk about it. The “Je suis Charlie” demonstrations and the positions taken by major figures or associations have recreated tolerance, unlike the rise of identity that took place in the United States after September 11. What we see on our screens and what we perceive from public debates does not reflect society.
This work is based on statements, but other reports, notably from the Ministry of the Interior, have recorded an increase in racist and anti-Semitic acts in recent months.
It’s like the acceptance of homosexuality: on the declarative, the progress is impressive. At the same time, homophobic attacks are recorded very regularly. On the one hand, because the people attacked, whether they are homosexual or Jewish, say so more. On the other hand, the public authorities have become aware of the seriousness of these acts. The attack on a synagogue in La Grande-Motte [24 août] shows that there is a persistence of anti-Semitism and we know that anti-Semitic acts have been increasing since October 7 in particular. But in terms of opinion, anti-Semitism continues to decline. Today, more than 90% of French people say that Jews are French like any other, compared to 60% in 1966, and a third in 1946. The fact that we have accepted that certain opinions are no longer expressed is important, especially since in Internet surveys, there is no investigator who encourages self-censorship. This is the first step towards change, not to mention the conversion effects of adult citizens, who are challenged by their children and grandchildren and who evolve.
Recent campaigns have, however, shown a liberation from racist speech.
The way of talking about migration issues has changed. Talking about Islam allows us to address immigration and to twist concepts such as secularism, the Republic, equality between men and women, to free ourselves from prejudices and anti-Muslim acts. Since the veil has been associated with the idea of the “great replacement” for over twenty years, we have legitimized being against it, and therefore against Islam. This France exists, it is numerically significant, but it is only part of the picture. Alongside these racist attacks, a whole part of society, which we do not see, is increasingly accepting ethnocultural diversity, including practices such as the veil, which is considered in the generations to come as a way of being among others.
So cultural values have taken precedence over socio-economic values as the driving force behind voting?
Yes. The rise of the cultural vote dates back to the 90s for the left and to Nicolas Sarkozy for the right. The paradox is that there are ups and downs. Demands for redistribution rise and fall according to a thermostatic logic. Citizens are not in a homogeneous acceptance of the reign of liberalism. Attachment to tax justice, to state control of businesses, to protection and social assistance, remains strong, including among the working classes. But these subjects produce fewer votes. They are rarely talked about, or in an individualistic manner. For example, purchasing power is valued for oneself and not redistribution for all. Among the working classes, the awareness of belonging to a collective has declined, making calls for equality less effective. With the exception of boomers, the working classes no longer vote, even for first-rate elections. In the 2024 legislative elections, despite the call for a republican front, nearly 40% of workers did not turn out.
Since 2017, what role has Macronism played in this relative shift to the right?
He is one of the actors, the Bollorean media [Vincent Bolloré contrôle C8, CNews, Télé-Loisirs, Gala, Voici, Capital, Paris-Match, Le Journal du dimanche, etc.] are another. Between the Mureaux speech, where Emmanuel Macron spoke of both Muslim separatism and discrimination, and the immigration law as it was adopted, it was the right wing that won. This is surprising because the vote for Macron, in 2017 and 2022, was first and foremost liberal libertarian: favorable to economic liberalism and diversity, to multiculturalism. While his electorate is on this line, Emmanuel Macron went hunting on the RN’s lands to deflate it. However, when a right-wing party begins to invest in the issues of the extreme right, to use its way of speaking, the latter finds itself legitimized and reinforced, this has already happened in Europe and is confirmed again in France. (Interview published on August 25, 2024 by the French daily Release)
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[1] The initial uprising in Clichy-sous-Bois in October 2005 occurred following the death of two teenagers – Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré – who were electrocuted inside an electrical substation while trying to escape a police check. A series of events unfolded and the uprising spread to the whole of Seine-Saint-Denis. A state of emergency was declared on 8 November for a period of three months. Around 3,000 people were arrested – in the context of infrastructure deterioration – with three deaths among the population. (Ed. Against)
